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ABSTRACT 
State supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court are the 
independent and final arbiters of their respective constitutions, and may 
therefore take different approaches to analogous issues under those 
constitutions. Such issues are common because the documents were 
modeled after one another and contain many of the same guarantees. In 
answering them, state courts have, as a matter of practice, generally 
adopted federal constitutional doctrine as their own. Federal courts, by 
contrast, have largely ignored state constitutional law when interpreting 
the federal Constitution. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, to take one 
recent and high-profile example, the Court declined to adopt the state 
courts’ near-unanimous conclusion that the proper standard of review for 
regulations of the “individual” right to keep and bear arms is a form of 
“reasonableness” review. 
In an age of growing international comparativism, this lack of 
intranational borrowing is striking, especially since state constitutions 
served as the template for the federal Constitution and generally protect 
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the same rights as are found in the federal Bill of Rights. In a constitutional 
system that claims to be committed to federalism and respect for the states, 
why is it that state constitutional law has had such a slight impact on 
federal constitutional doctrine? This Article seeks to answer that question, 
and suggests that in certain circumstances federal courts should look to 
state constitutional law when faced with analogous federal constitutional 
controversies.  
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
State constitutions and the federal Constitution overlap to a 
considerable degree, and the courts with final interpretive authority over 
them often confront the same questions: Should unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence be admissible in court?1 Do consenting adults have a 
constitutional right to engage in private sexual activity?2 By what standard 
should the constitutionality of gun control be judged?3 In answering those 
questions, scholars,4 state courts,5 and even Supreme Court Justices6 have 
repeatedly noted that state constitutions need not be interpreted in line with 
the federal Constitution. And yet state courts have relied heavily—at times 
completely and explicitly—on federal constitutional doctrine when 
interpreting their own charters, even when the language, history, and intent 
of the latter are distinct. 
The opposite, however, is not even remotely true. With a few notable 
exceptions, the Supreme Court7 has largely ignored state doctrine when 
constructing federal constitutional rules, even in areas in which the states 
have a widely shared and well-articulated constitutional doctrine 
addressing an issue on which the Supreme Court itself has never 
 
 1. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 2. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 3. See infra Part IV.C. 
 4. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 400 (1988) (“[N]either logic nor history requires that [state courts] accord 
state constitutional language the same meaning as the United States Supreme Court has accorded a 
comparable provision of the federal Constitution.”); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s 
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 
402 (1984) [hereinafter Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow] (criticizing the lockstep approach 
explained in Part II.B); Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional 
Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 171–76 (1987) (same). 
 5. See generally Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. 
REV. 165 (1984) (arguing, as Oregon Supreme Court justice, for robust state constitutionalism and its 
significance in current federal constitutional law). 
 6. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions] (calling for state courts 
to provide broader protection of state constitutional rights than the Supreme Court was then providing 
for federal constitutional rights); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 761, 763, 777 (1961) [hereinafter Brennan, The Bill of Rights] (describing the tension between 
federalism and the “incorporation” doctrine, and concluding that “[i]t is reason for deep satisfaction that 
many of the states effectively enforce the counterparts in state constitutions of the specifics of the Bill 
of Rights”). 
 7. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the United States Supreme Court as the “Supreme Court” 
or the “Court” throughout this Article. 
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pronounced. The relative absence of state constitutional law as persuasive 
authority in federal cases is all the more striking because state legislation 
has received a substantial amount of scholarly and even judicial attention, 
at least in certain legal contexts.8 For example, the Court has found that the 
“clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”9 State constitutions, 
by contrast, have largely been left out in the cold. Why, in a system that 
claims to be committed to federalism and respect for the states, are state 
supreme courts’ interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions so 
thoroughly ignored? If states have a constitutionally guaranteed role as 
laboratories for constitutional innovation,10 why does the Court discard the 
lab results? 
The easy answers are insufficient. The Supremacy Clause11 does not 
require the Supreme Court to turn a blind eye to state constitutional law. 
State and federal courts are the final interpreters of their respective 
constitutions, to be sure, but it is no more constitutionally impermissible for 
federal courts to borrow state doctrine than it is for state courts to rely on 
federal doctrine. It is also true that state constitutions differ from the federal 
document. But that is not enough either, unless one thinks that all 
comparativism is illegitimate, or that it is inappropriate for state courts to 
borrow federal doctrine, as they almost universally do. Of course, neither 
system should automatically and uncritically adopt the holdings of the 
other,12 but that is not the same as looking—in either direction—for 
persuasive authority. After all, if the Justices are comfortable citing 
international sources13 and even law reviews, why not also take an 
intranational comparative approach by drawing from sources and judges 
who are part of the same constitutional system? 
 
 8. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (2009) 
(“The United States Supreme Court frequently bases federal constitutional doctrine on state law, often 
doing so by counting states’ laws in a variety of doctrinal contexts to determine the legislative 
consensus among the States.”). 
 9. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 
370 (1989) (“First among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction 
are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987))).  
 10. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 12. See supra note 4 (criticizing the lockstep approach). 
 13. See generally David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 539 (2001) (surveying the practice of comparative constitutionalism and suggesting a model for 
its proper use); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1225 (1999) (similar). 
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This Article represents a first effort to consider systematically the 
costs and benefits of using state constitutional doctrine to address problems 
arising under the federal Constitution. Although it is impossible (and 
unnecessary) to say that the approach will be useful or appropriate in all 
cases, the basic thesis of the Article is that federal judges confronted with 
federal constitutional controversies can and should draw more on the 
expertise of state courts that have addressed parallel controversies under 
their own constitutions. The aim is to describe an interpretive tool that is 
both normatively desirable, in that it is consistent with shared conceptions 
about constitutional interpretation and federalism, and practically useful, in 
that it is realistic about the differences between state and federal 
constitutions and the relative and relevant competencies of state and federal 
courts. The structure of the Article reflects this dual descriptive-normative 
goal. It begins with a description of current practice, identifies and 
evaluates reasons that might explain that practice, measures the thesis 
against past cases, and suggests how it might be used in the future. 
Part II provides a brief overview of the content and interpretation of 
state constitutions. Although state constitutions are far more prolix than 
their federal counterpart, they overlap to a considerable degree with it and 
with one another—an unsurprising fact once one considers that the federal 
Constitution was patterned on state constitutions14 and that subsequent state 
constitutional provisions have adopted (sometimes directly) the language of 
the federal Constitution. That, in any event, is the conclusion that drives the 
major schools of state constitutional interpretation, all of which focus on 
the degree to which state supreme courts should or should not adopt federal 
constitutional law as their own. But despite state courts’ heavy reliance on 
the Supreme Court’s construction of parallel federal provisions, there has 
been no corresponding call for the Court to look to state constitutional law 
for illumination of federal problems. 
Part III describes a simple thesis—that state constitutional doctrine 
should more often be used as persuasive authority in federal constitutional 
cases—and tests some arguments for and against it. Whereas incorporation 
means applying federal constitutional standards against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, this type of “reverse incorporation”15 would 
mean applying state constitutional law against the federal government (and, 
 
 14. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 97 (1998). 
 15. I do not mean to suggest any formal reliance on the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment–based 
incorporation jurisprudence, or on the “reverse incorporation” effectuated in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The approach I describe could just as accurately be called “intranational 
borrowing” or “comparative judicial federalism.” 
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by extension, the rest of the states, so long as the right at issue has been 
incorporated) through the mechanism of persuasive authority or 
constitutional borrowing. Part III.A considers some arguments in favor of 
the practice, including respect for the political values of federalism, use of 
the experience and expertise of state courts as laboratories for 
constitutional innovation, reliance on a more “objective” measure of 
current constitutional values, and other general benefits of constitutional 
comparativism. But reliance on state constitutional law is not without its 
drawbacks, and Part III.B considers some of the arguments against it. 
These include the potential for conflict with interpretive approaches like 
originalism and textualism, the possibility that state constitutional law is 
simply too different, weak, or “political” to be a useful comparator, and the 
practical difficulty of identifying and utilizing state constitutional law in a 
system in which the states differ so much from one another.  
In an attempt to synthesize these arguments for and against, Part IV.A 
suggests a taxonomy for what kinds of cases lend themselves to borrowing 
state constitutional law. The normative desirability of the thesis, in other 
words, varies not only according to one’s preferred interpretive 
methodology, but also with regard to the constitutional controversy at 
issue. In some areas, state law may simply serve as persuasive authority; in 
others, state constitutions have (or should have) a much stronger role.16 
Part IV also demonstrates that the thesis has, in some areas of law, 
been descriptively accurate. First, the Supreme Court has looked to state 
constitutional law for guidance in criminal procedure cases, particularly 
with regard to the exclusionary rule and the right to counsel. Second, the 
Court has done so in its due process cases, by using state constitutional law 
to identify rights that should be considered “fundamental” and thus 
protected by the federal Due Process Clause or incorporated against the rest 
of the states through that same clause. Finally, in Eighth Amendment cases 
the Court has relied heavily on state law, some of it constitutional, as 
evidence of “evolving standards of decency.”17 The first example involves 
the persuasive authority of state constitutional law; the second and third 
examples are much closer to a mandatory reverse incorporation model that 
uses state law not simply to influence federal doctrine, but to define it. 
 
 16. I elaborate on this argument and address other underlying normative concerns in Joseph 
Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 114 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–17, 339–40 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989). 
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Part IV concludes by considering McDonald v. City of Chicago,18 the 
most recent case involving an issue on which state constitutional law was 
well developed and federal constitutional law nonexistent: the appropriate 
standard of review by which to evaluate gun control. McDonald is a 
particularly interesting case study because the right it involved—the 
“individual” right to keep and bear arms—was constitutionally protected at 
the state level long before District of Columbia v. Heller19 (which itself 
cited state law20) declared it to be protected by the Second Amendment as 
well.21 Thus, the McDonald court was faced with the prospect of 
incorporating against the states a right that they already recognized, a fact 
the Court noted in declaring the right “fundamental” and thus subject to 
incorporation. But in doing so, the Court declined to adopt the 
constitutional doctrine that the states had unanimously embraced, one 
allowing for “reasonable” regulations of firearms.22 The thesis of this 
Article suggests that if the Court looks to state constitutions to determine 
the existence of a fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms, then 
it should also look to state constitutional law to define the contours of that 
right. 
II.  STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
This part gives an overview of the terrain, first describing the history 
and content of state constitutions and then briefly laying out some of the 
major issues in state constitutional interpretation. 
A.  STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
State constitutions are in a very real sense the root of American 
constitutionalism.23 In fact, “State Constitutions are the oldest things in the 
 
 18. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 20. See id. at 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584–85, 590 n.13, 591, 600–04, 612–14, 629. See also id. at 640–
42, 648 n.10, 651 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 21. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 191, 192, 206–07 tbl.1 (2006) (noting that forty-four states recognize an individual right to bear 
arms). 
 22. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 687 (2007) 
(“Under the standard uniformly applied by the states, any law that is a ‘reasonable regulation’ of the 
arms right is constitutionally permissible.”). 
 23. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 
989 (1996) (“State charters are the foundation of American Constitutional law.”). See generally Gordon 
S. Wood, Foreword, State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911 
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political history of America, for they are continuations and representatives 
of the royal colonial charters, whereby the earliest English settlements in 
America were created.”24 By 1783—four years before the federal 
Constitution was sent to them for ratification—all but one of the then-
existing states had formally adopted written constitutions, the majority of 
which included specific declarations of rights.25 These state constitutions 
not only predated their federal counterpart, but also inspired its structure 
and some of its most recognizable features.26 
The existence of these state constitutional guarantees shaped the 
ratification debates, particularly the debate about the need for (and possible 
content of) a federal bill of rights. The fact that the federal Constitution 
omitted a declaration of rights when it was submitted to the states “stood in 
sharp contrast to the state constitutions . . . virtually all of which contained 
explicit provisions” to that effect.27 The Federalists and Antifederalists 
drew opposite conclusions from that contrast. The Federalists argued, 
among other things, that political safeguards were sufficient to protect 
individual rights and that the states’ bills of rights were not worthy of 
emulation.28 The Antifederalists responded that the federal government 
should hold itself to the same limitations as the states did themselves.29 
When the Federalists eventually gave in and drafted a federal bill of rights, 
they looked to the states’ bills of rights as a model.30 Thus, “Far from being 
 
(1993) (discussing the role of state constitutions in establishing “the primary conceptions of America’s 
political and constitutional culture”).  
 24. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 
1199 (1985) (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 413 (2d rev. ed. 1891)). See 
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3066 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“After 
declaring their independence, the newly formed States replaced their colonial charters with constitutions 
and state bills of rights, almost all of which guaranteed the same fundamental rights that the former 
colonists previously had claimed by virtue of their English heritage.”). 
 25. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 379, 381 (1980). 
 26. LUTZ, supra note 14, at 97. 
 27. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 28. James Madison, for example, clearly considered the state protections problematic: 
[S]ome States have no bills of rights [four states had none], there are others provided with 
very defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but 
absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican principles 
would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty. 
Brennan, The Bill of Rights, supra note 6, at 763 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (1789) (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834)). 
 29. See, e.g., Roger Sherman, A Countryman, II., in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 218, 219–20 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892). 
 30. Holland, supra note 23, at 997 (“In fact, state Declarations of Rights were the primary origin 
and model for the provisions set forth in the Federal Bill of Rights.”). See also LEONARD W. LEVY, 
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1–11 (1999); Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 501 
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the model for the states, the Federal Bill of Rights was added to the 
Constitution to meet demands for the same guarantees against the new 
central government that people had secured against their own local 
officials.”31 As Justice Brennan would later note, “Prior to the adoption of 
the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the 
federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more state 
constitutions.”32 
James Gardner explains that “state constitutions were originally 
intended to be the primary vehicles for protecting the liberties of 
Americans, not the supplementary charters they have in many ways 
become.”33 And despite the addition of the federal Bill of Rights, state 
constitutions remained the primary guarantors of individual rights 
throughout most of American history.34 Over time, however, the federal 
Constitution displaced state constitutions as the most important source of 
individual rights. There are many reasons for this, but certainly much of the 
blame must lie with the states, which trampled rights their constitutions 
nominally guaranteed, and with the state judges who acquiesced.35 The 
 
(explaining that state court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s “put[] to rest the notion that state 
constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal Bill of Rights. The lesson of history is 
otherwise; indeed, the drafters of the federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the 
various state constitutions”); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1985) (noting that the federal Framers “derived much of their inspiration 
from guarantees provided by the colonies that became the original states”). 
 31. Linde, supra note 25, at 381. See also People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975) 
(“It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of 
Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of 
Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the 
reverse.”). 
 32. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 501 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of 
Rights and the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963)). See also Stewart G. Pollock, 
Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and 
Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979 (1985) (“Before the enactment of the first ten amendments to 
the United States Constitution, fundamental liberties such as freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures were protected by state constitutions.”). 
 33. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
773 (1992). 
 34. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an 
Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2004) (“As James Madison 
suggested during the ratification debates, for the first 175 years after the adoption of the federal 
Constitution, state constitutions were the primary guarantors of individual rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
 35. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1018 (2003) (“[F]or a long period of time state equality guarantees lay relatively 
dormant, ignored by state courts or enervated by them of their potential vitality.”). See generally 
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (exploring 
the role of antebellum judges in applying the law of slavery). But see Williams, supra note 24, at 1203 
(“State constitutional equality provisions played a minor but important part in the overall process of 
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Civil War and Reconstruction, of course, inaugurated a sea change from a 
state-based protection of individual rights toward one that was federally 
centered.36 The Fourteenth Amendment’s declaration that all citizens of the 
states were also citizens of the United States, subject to the protections of 
its laws and Constitution,37 laid the textual foundation for this move. 
As a doctrinal matter, the state-to-federal shift put into motion by the 
Fourteenth Amendment stumbled at first,38 but became a constitutional 
reality in the twentieth century through the Court’s “incorporation” 
jurisprudence. That doctrine has bound the states to almost all of the 
guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights—the same list of rights that was 
inspired by state constitutions two centuries ago. Incorporation, however, 
does not require state courts to interpret their own constitutions in lockstep 
with the federal document. A state court can interpret its state’s free speech 
right as being more or less expansive than the First Amendment, for 
example, even if the two are identically worded and even though the state 
itself cannot violate the federal standard.39 
State courts’ efforts to craft a distinct and useful state constitutional 
doctrine in the shadow of the federal document are discussed in more detail 
in the following section. Suffice it to say their task has been eased 
somewhat by the fact that state constitutions echo one another and the 
federal Constitution.40 Whether because they have copied the federal 
document or because it copied them, most state constitutions today contain 
rights guarantees that are either identical or substantially similar to those 
found in the federal charter. Every state has a bill of rights,41 and almost all 
of them reproduce in some form or another the full list of rights protected 
 
eliminating slavery and segregation.”). 
 36. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“The 
constitutional Amendments adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War fundamentally altered our 
country’s federal system.”). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37 (1873) (interpreting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause narrowly). 
 39. Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1123, 
1127 (1992) (“[N]othing in federal constitutional law prevents state courts from interpreting state law 
more narrowly than federal, despite the fact that they are barred [by the Supremacy Clause] from 
enforcing the less-protective state law.”). 
 40. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 50–55 (1998) (noting that state 
constitutions have borrowed extensively from one another); James A. Gardner, State Constitutional 
Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1003, 1029 (2003) (“[T]he texts of the state constitutions are, at many critical points, similar or 
even identical to one another and to parallel provisions of the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 41. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1015. 
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by the federal Bill of Rights.42 “For example, the constitutions of thirty-two 
states contain due process clauses identical to the Due Process Clauses of 
the . . . U.S. Constitution” and “[t]he constitutions of thirty-seven states 
contain language identical to the Speedy Trial Clause of the federal Sixth 
Amendment.”43 All but one state specifically protect the right to free 
speech, and each protects the rights to freedom of religion, to a jury trial, 
and from unreasonable searches and seizures.44 
Although they cover the same ground as the federal Bill of Rights, 
nearly all state constitutions also go much further in terms of the rights they 
protect. Many guarantee “positive” rights—obligations on the government 
to provide public education, for example45—which are unheard of in the 
federal system.46 But perhaps the most striking (and arguably most 
important) aspect of state constitutions is not their substantive content, but 
the ease with which they can be amended, and the corresponding frequency 
with which they are.47 As discussed in more detail in Part III.B.2, this 
feature has important implications for state constitutionalism and its 
relationship with federal constitutional law. 
B.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Just as the language of federal and state constitutions has been closely 
 
 42. Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 
VAL. U. L. REV. 125 app. at 165–82 (1969) (comparing state bills of rights provisions to guarantees in 
the federal Bill of Rights and finding substantial similarities). See also id. at 138 (“Every state provides 
for the protection of some or all of the rights usually referred to as First Amendment rights. All states, 
with varying degrees of generality or specificity, guarantee the free exercise of religion and freedom of 
the press.”); id. at 139 (“The Second and Third Amendments are also well represented in the 
states . . . . The Fourth Amendment search and seizure warrant provisions are present in some degree in 
every state . . . .”); id. at 140 (“With the exception of the requirement of indictment by grand jury, all of 
the Fifth Amendment rights are well represented . . . . Almost all Sixth Amendment rights are also 
present in most of the states.”); id. at 140–41 (reaching a similar conclusion with regard to the Seventh 
and Eighth Amendments). 
 43. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1029.  
 44. Id. at 1028. Delaware is the outlier, lacking an explicit provision protecting freedom of 
speech. Id. at 1028 n.118. 
 45. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 
62 VA. L. REV. 873, 917 (1976) (“Today forty-two state constitutions direct the legislature to establish a 
system of schools.”); Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 459, 466 n.27 (1996) (“Every state constitution, except that of Mississippi, includes an 
education clause, requiring provision of free public education.”). See also Allen W. Hubsch, The 
Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1335–42 (1992) 
(discussing state constitutional educational rights). 
 46. See Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State 
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1533–34 (2010).  
 47. See infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
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related since the Founding, so too has the interpretation of those 
constitutions by federal and state judges. To take just one fundamental but 
often overlooked example, judicial review—sometimes characterized as the 
most important proposition in American constitutional law48—was a state 
constitutional principle before John Marshall embraced it in Marbury v. 
Madison.49 As Jeff Powell notes, “Only the eclipse of state constitutional 
law has led to Marbury’s enthronement as the case that ‘established’ 
judicial review.”50 That eclipse has been lengthy and almost total. Despite 
their formal interpretive independence, state courts have generally followed 
the Supreme Court’s lead, adopting its tests and doctrines as their own. 
Thus, the first question for state constitutional interpretation is an 
existential one: Can and should it be an enterprise independent from the 
Supreme Court’s exposition of the federal Constitution?  
As a doctrinal matter, the most important starting point is the fact that 
state courts have final authority in construing state charters, just as the 
Supreme Court bears ultimate power over the federal Constitution.51 This 
means that there is no legal reason why state courts must construe their 
own cases in “lockstep” with federal doctrine, even when the terms of the 
rights guarantees are identical.52 As a result, state courts can accord 
protection to state constitutional rights that differs from the protection 
given by federal courts to analogous federal rights. In practice, of course, 
state protections that fall below the federal floor are unlikely ever to be 
invoked, since states may not violate those federal rights that have been 
incorporated against them. But where states accord more protection than 
the Court has given for analogous federal rights, the federal floor might 
become irrelevant.53  
 
 48. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 39 (3d 
ed. 2006) (“Marbury v. Madison is the single most important decision in American constitutional 
law.”). 
 49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Howard, supra note 45, at 877 
(“[L]ong before Chief Justice John Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison, state courts had begun 
fashioning the doctrine of judicial review.”). 
 50. H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53 ALB. L. REV. 
283, 294 (1989). 
 51. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(providing examples of state supreme court decisions interpreting state constitutions to protect 
individual rights); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial 
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100 (2000) (“[S]tate supreme courts have the unquestioned, 
final authority to interpret their state constitutions.”). 
 52. See Gardner, supra note 40, at 1030. 
 53. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (“Individual states may surely construe 
their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal 
Constitution.”); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013–14 (1983) (“It is elementary that States are 
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With that basic interpretive fact in mind, it is somewhat less surprising 
that throughout much of American history, state constitutional 
interpretation was the most important game in town. When the Court (per 
Chief Justice Marshall) held in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore54 that states 
were not beholden to the federal Bill of Rights, the only “individual rights” 
provisions they were bound to respect were those found in their own 
constitutions. Moreover, at least until the 1930s, state statutes and common 
law were more important than their federal equivalents. In the 1970s, 
Justice Brennan reminisced that in the “days of innocence” of his early law 
practice, “the preoccupation of the profession, bench and bar, was with 
questions usually answered by application of state common law principles 
or state statutes.”55 
Of course, the preeminence of state law changed in part due to the 
New Deal,56 as the reach of federal law grew in ways that would have been 
unimaginable decades earlier. But in the decades following this expansion 
of federal statutory law (and the “structural” constitutional law necessary to 
justify and sustain it57), an even more serious challenge to the centrality of 
state constitutional law would emerge. This was the Supreme Court’s 
“incorporation” doctrine, which applied the guarantees of the federal Bill of 
Rights to the states. The process of incorporation began slowly in the 
1930s, but accelerated throughout the 1960s under the Warren Court.58 
This expansion of federal rights was doubtless due in part to state courts’ 
apparent inability or unwillingness to effectuate the rights guaranteed by 
their own constitutions.59  
 
free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution 
requires.”); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (noting that each state has a 
“sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those 
conferred by the Federal Constitution”). 
 54. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833). 
 55. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 489. 
 56. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42–44 (1991) (“[T]he 1930’s 
mark the definitive constitutional triumph of activist national government.”). 
 57. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
 58. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 493 (“It was in the years from 1962 to 1969 
that the face of the law changed.”). 
 59. See Linde, supra note 5, at 174; David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State 
Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274, 280 (1992) (arguing that incorporation doctrine “resulted 
from the unwillingness of many state courts, particularly in the South, to use their own constitutions to 
protect their citizens from state overreaching”). For a contemporary observation on the issue, see 
Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 
620, 642 (1951) (“Although state constitutions contain full statements of our civil liberties, . . . . [o]nly 
occasionally do state cases concerned with freedom of press, speech, assembly and worship take a 
position protecting the freedoms beyond what has been required by the United States Supreme Court.”). 
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Incorporation, combined with the Warren Court’s expansive reading 
of the federal rights that were being incorporated, effectively sidelined state 
constitutional law.60 States could continue to read their constitutions 
however they pleased—many had already recognized the rights that were 
being incorporated against them61—but the Supremacy Clause required 
them to treat the federal guarantees as a “floor” beneath which state rights 
could not fall. As a result, state constitutional law emerged as an 
independent legal force only where it exceeded the federal floor.62 And 
since relatively few state courts were inclined to read rights more broadly 
than the Warren Court, the Federal Reporter effectively displaced state 
constitutions.63 Any litigant with a modicum of litigation savvy knew to put 
federal claims front and center, meaning that state court decisions were 
increasingly ignored by litigants64 and scholars65 alike. And many state 
courts, knowing that federal rights were so expansive, tended to resolve 
cases on the basis of federal guarantees rather than state analogues. The 
result was an atrophying of state constitutional interpretation. 
 
 60. Charles G. Douglas, III, State Judicial Activism—The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1978) (“The federalization of all our rights has led to a rapid withering 
of the development of state decisions based upon state constitutional provisions.”); Gardner, supra note 
33, at 805 (“By far the most widely accepted explanation for the poverty of contemporary state 
constitutional law holds that it was marginalized by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation 
doctrine.”); James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Foreword, The New Frontier of State Constitutional Law, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2005) (noting that after the Warren Court’s expansive 
reading of individual rights, “state constitutional law was seen, not illogically, as in some fundamental 
way subordinate to national constitutional law”).  
 61. Linde, supra note 25, at 382 (“[T]he states had all these guarantees in their own laws long 
before the Federal Bill of Rights was applied to the states. State courts had been administering these 
laws, sometimes generously, more often not, for a century or more without awaiting an interpretation 
from the United States Supreme Court.”). 
 62. See Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of 
the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 297 (1977) (“Because United States Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and the 14th amendment mark the minimum guarantees of 
individual rights, state courts that give truly independent force to their own constitutions generally reach 
decisions more protective of those rights than the Supreme Court.”). 
 63. Force, supra note 42, at 125 (suggesting, partly in jest, “The state Bills of Rights have been 
superseded. No one pays any attention to them anymore; lawyers don’t even cite them in their briefs 
now. A state constitution should be streamlined. The Bill of Rights has to go!”). 
 64. Linde, supra note 25, at 391 (“A generation of lawyers brought up on United States Supreme 
Court opinions seems literally speechless when we ask from the bench, as we sometimes do, how we 
should decide a constitutional question if the Supreme Court has never addressed it.”); Paulsen, supra 
note 59, at 620 (“State court decisions and state constitutional materials are too frequently ignored by 
both commentator and counsel when civil liberties questions arise.”). 
 65. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed 
Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 936 (1993) (decrying the “ingrained assumption[]” that “attention to 
the constitutional law of a state . . . is for ambitious professors and law review editors a distinctly minor 
league game”). 
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But if state constitutional interpretation was submerged when the 
Warren Court’s tide rolled in, it was uncovered again when that tide rolled 
back out. As belief spread that the Burger Court would not read individual 
rights guarantees as expansively as its predecessor, state constitutional 
guarantees ceased being irrelevant—the federal floor had receded, and it 
was now possible that a state constitutional claim might succeed where its 
federal analogue would fail. Liberals saw their opportunity.66 Led by 
Justice Brennan—who called them to arms both in his opinions (usually 
dissents67) and in articles and speeches—liberals urged state courts to “step 
into the breach” left by the Burger Court’s “contraction of federal rights 
and remedies on grounds of federalism.”68 The “Magna Carta” of this new 
movement in state constitutional interpretation was Justice Brennan’s 1977 
Harvard Law Review article, “State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights,”69 in which he called on state courts to reclaim ground 
the Burger Court had allegedly given away.70 Brennan undoubtedly saw 
 
 66. It seems to be relatively well accepted that the push for expanded state constitutionalism was 
a liberal phenomenon. Kahn, supra note 45, at 464 (“State constitutionalism represented a kind of 
forum shopping for liberals.”); Johansen, supra note 62, at 299 (“Writers on both sides of the 
independent interpretation debate suggest that state courts are turning to their own constitutions 
primarily because they disagree with the growing ‘conservatism’ of the Burger Court.”); Earl M. Maltz, 
The Political Dynamic of the “New Judicial Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 233, 235 
(1989) (“[T]he revival of interest in state constitutionalism is generally conceded to be a reaction to the 
Burger Court’s perceived hostility to Warren Court activism and its extension.”). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454–55 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 735 n.18 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 
120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In light of today’s erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of 
federal constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from 
adhering to higher standards under state law.”). 
 68. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions 
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). See also Brennan Lauds State 
Courts for Taking Lead in Defending Rights, 18 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., May 1, 1987, at 5. Similar voices 
were heard even before Warren E. Burger became Chief Justice. See, e.g., Force, supra note 42, at 126 
(“[S]tates in the past have played an important, although far from ideal, role in the protection of 
individual rights and must be prepared to play an even more important role in the future.”). Justice 
Brennan himself had been emphasizing these issues for years, and already in 1961 had written of the 
importance of state guarantees of individual rights beyond the “incorporation” doctrine, and encouraged 
judicial intervention and a larger role for state courts in enforcing state bills of rights. Brennan, The Bill 
of Rights, supra note 6, at 777–78. 
 69. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6. 
 70. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983) (describing Brennan’s article as the “Magna Carta of state 
constitutional law”). See also Friedman, supra note 51, at 93 (claiming that “[t]he story of the modern 
state constitutionalism movement begins with [Brennan’s article]”); Gardner, supra note 40, at 1031 
(concluding that the “present era in state constitutional jurisprudence can be traced” to Brennan’s 
article); Kahn, supra note 45, at 459 n.2 (referring to Brennan’s article as “the starting point of a new 
scholarly attention to state constitutionalism”). Hans A. Linde, however, concludes that 
“[c]ontemporary discussion in the law reviews began . . . in 1969.” Linde, supra note 5, at 175 (citing 
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this as a way to expand individual rights,71 and for good reason: state 
constitutional doctrine will almost inevitably have a rights-expanding 
effect, since—at least for state constitutional rights whose federal 
analogues have been incorporated—state constitutional law will be 
irrelevant wherever it falls below the federal floor, but can always build on 
that floor.72 Even so, the desire for a more robust system of state 
constitutional interpretation was not, and is not, confined to liberals. Many 
supported—and continue to support—the importance of state constitutional 
law on grounds that are not so outcome oriented, or which focus on 
principles like federalism.73 Chief Justice Burger, for example, 
occasionally gestured toward an expanded role for state courts.74 
The degree to which state courts have answered the call to action 
remains debatable. Paul Kahn writes that “[a]s much as any judicial 
opinion [Brennan] ever wrote, this plea has influenced the development of 
American constitutionalism.”75 This is certainly true in some sense: many 
state courts gave broader protection to state constitutional rights than the 
Burger Court did for those rights’ federal analogues.76 This was most 
notable in the area of criminal procedure, where the Burger Court was 
perceived as being especially rights restrictive and some state courts 
responded by expanding state-level protections.77 
 
Force, supra note 42).  
 71. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 432 (1988) (criticizing Brennan’s outcome-oriented vision of state 
constitutional law). 
 72. Id. at 433 (concluding that it is “virtually guarantee[d] that state court activism” primarily 
will favor liberal causes and have a liberal effect because state courts have to respect the floor set by 
federal rights guarantees).  
 73. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421 (1996) (“[T]he continuing strength of this movement does not derive from a 
desire to continue, at the state level, the agenda of the Warren-Brennan Court. It derives from the 
aspiration of state court judges to be independent sources of law.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 440 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(“For all we know, the state courts would find this statute invalid under the State Constitution, but no 
one on either side of the case thought to discuss this or exhibit any interest in the subject.”). 
 75. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1147, 1147 (1993). 
 76. TARR, supra note 40, at 165–66 (finding that between 1950 and 1969, state courts relied on 
state constitutions to afford greater protection than the federal Constitution in only ten cases, but that 
they did so in more than three hundred cases between 1970 and 1986); Brennan, supra note 68, at 549 
(“[S]tate courts have responded with marvelous enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the 
constitutional gaps left by the decisions of the Supreme Court majority.”); James N.G. Cauthen, 
Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1201–02 
(2000) (concluding that state supreme courts have, in hundreds of cases, interpreted state constitutions 
to provide more protection for individual liberties than similar provisions of the federal Constitution).  
 77. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 
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On the other hand, either from force of habit, mistaken belief that they 
were bound by the federal rules, lack of expertise, or simply because they 
agreed with the Burger Court’s reasoning, most state courts continued to 
apply their own constitutional provisions in lockstep with federal 
analogues.78 To this day, most state courts adopt federal constitutional law 
as their own.79 Bowing to the nationalization of constitutional discourse, 
they “tend to follow whatever doctrinal vocabulary is used by the United 
States Supreme Court, discussed in the law reviews, and taught in the law 
schools.”80 
As state courts struggled with the questions of when, why, and how to 
follow or diverge from federal doctrine, the debate launched by Justice 
Brennan in the pages of the Harvard Law Review began to fill other law 
journals with scholarly treatment of what many called the “New Judicial 
Federalism.” That scholarship did not—and still has not81—come 
anywhere near rivaling the attention lavished on the federal Constitution, 
but after decades in the wilderness its appearance in polite society has 
nonetheless been startling. The literature is too varied to summarize easily, 
but it is fair to say that the major question it seeks to answer is whether 
state courts should follow federal constitutional law when addressing state 
constitutional questions. 
At least three major schools of thought have emerged—all of them 
useful both as descriptions of state courts’ actual behavior and as normative 
accounts of what that behavior should be. The first is known as the primacy 
 
873, 873–75 (1975); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court 
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 425–26 (1974). 
 78. Gardner & Rossi, supra note 60, at 1233 (“[S]tate courts often acted as though they need not 
bother to look any further than the shared national principles embodied in the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 79. Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial 
Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 47 (1992) (concluding “that much constitutional policymaking by 
state supreme courts involves application of national judicial policy to the states”); Fitzpatrick, supra 
note 34, at 1850 (“Despite . . . criticism, the lockstep approach remains the most common approach to 
state constitutionalism.”); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Federalism, Liberty and State 
Constitutional Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1997) (“Despite the considerable hoopla 
afforded a few decisions from a few states, the vast majority of state courts follow federal law when 
construing the liberty-protecting provisions of their own constitutions . . . .”).  
 80. Linde, supra note 5, at 186. 
 81. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105 n.228 (1981) (“[D]espite the increasing 
activism of some courts, the state judiciary remains at the periphery of the scholars’ vision.”); Jennifer 
Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and 
Federal Constitutional Law, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25, 32 (1993) (“It is past the hour when state 
constitutional law should lose the glamour of innovation and become part of the standardized 
curriculum.”). 
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approach, and is associated with law professor and former justice of the 
Oregon Supreme Court Hans Linde. Under this approach, state courts faced 
with state and federal constitutional claims should resolve the former first, 
thereby encouraging the growth of an independent and relevant body of 
state constitutional law.82 The second approach is called the criteria (or 
interstitial83) approach, under which “state courts assume ‘the dominance 
of federal law and focus directly on the gap-filling potential of state 
constitutions.’”84 Under this approach, federal constitutional law plays the 
lead role, with state constitutional law emerging only in certain predefined 
circumstances or where gaps remain to be filled. The third method is 
known somewhat derogatively as the lockstep approach, under which state 
courts interpret their constitutional provisions as having the same meaning 
as their federal analogues.85 This final approach is perhaps the most 
accurate descriptively,86 but it is nonetheless widely reviled by scholars of 
state constitutional law. Overlaying the discussions of these three 
approaches to state constitutional interpretation, as well as various 
permutations and iterations thereof, are sharply divergent views about 
whether a robust state constitutionalism is desirable, or even possible.87 
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve, nor even thoroughly to 
explore, the debate about how state courts should interpret their own 
constitutions, but rather to focus on if and how federal courts should rely 
on those interpretations. For that debate, the relevant point is that a major—
and perhaps primary—question for state constitutional law has been the 
degree to which state courts should rely on federal constitutional doctrine 
when interpreting parallel provisions of state constitutions. And yet there 
has been no corresponding call for federal courts to learn from the state 
 
 82. See Linde, supra note 5, at 178 (“My own view has long been that a state court always is 
responsible for the law of its state before deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard, so 
that no federal issue is properly reached when the state’s law protects the claimed right.”); Hans A. 
Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 135 (1970) 
(“Claims raised under the state constitution should always be dealt with and disposed of before reaching 
a fourteenth amendment claim of deprivation of due process or equal protection.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 83. Gardner, supra note 33, at 774–75. Justin Long describes a similar approach he calls 
“intermittent” state constitutionalism. See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. 
REV. 41, 48–50 (2006).  
 84. Friedman, supra note 51, at 104 (quoting Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of 
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1357 (1982)). 
 85. Id. at 102 (“Under the lockstep approach, the state constitutional analysis begins and ends 
with consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”).  
 86. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 33, at 823–32 (presenting practical and normative arguments 
against robust state constitutionalism); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its 
Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 286–300 (1998) (similar). 
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courts, despite the fact that many of the benefits of constitutional 
borrowing would presumably flow in that direction as well. The following 
part considers why this asymmetry exists and whether it is justified. 
III.  USING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION  
The overall project of this Article is to consider whether state 
constitutional law is, can be, and perhaps should be a useful tool for federal 
constitutional interpretation. Rather than suggesting a single overarching 
answer to that question, this part aims to consider the weighty arguments 
for and against such a practice. 
By cataloguing positives and negatives, I do not mean to suggest that 
determining the appropriateness of borrowing state constitutional law is a 
simple matter of counting up hash marks and finding, for example, three 
convincing arguments in favor and only two against. Undoubtedly some 
arguments are more important than others. Nor by listing arguments do I 
mean to indicate that there are no deeper threads connecting them. To the 
contrary, separating the arguments is important precisely because it makes 
it easier to tease out those threads.  
Moreover, identifying the separate arguments helps demonstrate how 
the use of state constitutional law as an interpretive aid fits more 
comfortably with some theories of federal constitutional interpretation than 
it does with others. For example, use of state constitutional law may be 
particularly germane for those who believe in “pragmatic” adjudication,88 
since it provides a systematic way to take into account such practical 
matters as the experience and wisdom of state courts, and to a lesser degree 
the contemporary constitutional values of the people as a whole. For the 
same reasons, applying state constitutional law as an interpretive tool may 
be attractive to those who believe that there is a moral and ethical 
component to constitutional interpretation,89 or that constitutional law can 
 
 88. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
16 (2005); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 385 (2003) (“[P]ragmatic 
analyses are connected by their common origin in an unillusioned conception of the character, motives, 
and competence of the participants in the governmental process, whether judges, politicians, other 
officials, or ordinary voters.”).  
 89. See Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1385, 1391–97 (2005) (describing the system by which states’ moral experimentation 
should be allowed and encouraged, with the federal government imposing uniformity only after 
principles have become generally accepted).  
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and should be shaped by popular values.90 And for those who seek to 
interpret the Constitution in light of the “structure” it creates91—respect for 
the states being one of the most important incidents of that structure—
relying on states’ interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions is a 
powerful way to respect not just the states’ political branches, but their 
courts as well.  
A.  ARGUMENTS FOR 
For simplicity’s sake, the discussion here focuses on three potential 
benefits of using state constitutional law as persuasive authority: 
federalism, measuring contemporary constitutional values, and 
comparativism.  
1.  Federalism 
It has often been said that the hallmark of American constitutionalism 
is the division of power between the federal government and the states.92 
State constitutional law has an important and arguably underappreciated 
role to play in this federalist structure.93 
a.  States as Laboratories 
There are many ways to explain and justify our commitment (whether 
real or imagined) to federalism. One of the most powerful, however, 
derives from Justice Brandeis’s obligatorily quotable observation that “[i]t 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”94 The 
 
 90. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 107 (2004) (“In a world of popular constitutionalism, government officials are the 
regulated, not the regulators, and final interpretive authority rests with the people themselves.”). 
 91. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 
(1969) (“[J]udgment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which we 
tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which the text has 
created.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (describing the American system as “a 
government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers”); Jonathan Zasloff, The 
Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. REV. 795, 810 (1997) (“The separation of powers serves as the 
central hallmark of American constitutional structure.”). 
 93. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 
491 (1954) (“Nowhere is the theory and practice of American federalism more significantly revealed 
than in the constitutions of the states.”). See also Holland, supra note 23, at 989 (“A knowledge of the 
origins and history of state constitutions is essential to understanding federalism in the United States.”).  
 94. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court often invokes this principle when declining to create a 
single binding federal rule for the entire country.95 But states may also have 
experience with a constitutional problem before it ever reaches the 
Supreme Court. And if the Court is going to respect the role of states as 
laboratories, then it would seem that whenever the Court confronts a 
federal constitutional problem with a state analogue, it might usefully learn 
from the experience of the state courts that got there first. After all, if the 
Court defers to states’ laboratories while they work on a constitutional 
problem, shouldn’t the Court take into account whatever answer they 
reach? 
The use of the exclusionary rule, which is discussed in more detail 
below,96 provides an interesting and illustrative example. After the 
Supreme Court introduced the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United 
States,97 many state courts followed suit under their own constitutional 
guarantees. Most influential of these was the California Supreme Court, 
which concluded that no other rule sufficed to deter unconstitutional 
searches and seizures.98 When, in Mapp v. Ohio,99 the Supreme Court 
incorporated the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule against the states, 
it did so based largely on California’s experience.100 The Court followed 
the California Supreme Court’s conclusion not necessarily out of respect 
for state sovereignty, but because the state had hands-on experience with a 
specific problem and had, in its role as a laboratory, settled on a solution. 
That kind of pragmatic borrowing is different in kind from borrowing 
based on respect for federalism as a political value. It is also different from 
using the states as some kind of barometer for “moral” or values-based 
inquiries, such as the Court arguably does in the due process and Eighth 
Amendment contexts. 
In other words, state courts need not be independent laboratories. 
They can be part of the same general research institution as the Supreme 
Court.101 And respect for their work need not always lead the Supreme 
 
 95. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 718–19 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 
(1995); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579–80, 582 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441, 446 
(1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 
U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 96. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 97. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–93 (1914). 
 98. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 912–13 (Cal. 1955).  
 99. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 100. Id. at 651–52. 
 101. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 1148 (explaining that state courts should be viewed as having 
“the authority to put into place, within [each] community, [their] unique interpretation [of a] common 
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Court to avoid deciding issues; it can also be a factor in shaping the Court’s 
own federal constitutional jurisprudence.102 
b.  The Political Values of Federalism 
There is another federalism-related reason why state constitutional 
doctrine can be useful in resolving constitutional disputes: dividing power 
between the federal and state governments prevents either of them from 
overreaching, and can thereby help protect individual liberty.103 
Many theories of federalism emphasize the important role of the 
states’ political branches in preserving the federalist structure. The 
“political safeguards” theory of federalism, for example, focuses on the 
degree to which states can protect their own interests and sovereignty 
through political means.104 This view of federalism has, in turn, influenced 
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, perhaps most notably in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,105 in which the Court held that 
the Tenth Amendment need not serve as an independent check on 
congressional power, since the states can protect themselves through the 
political process. 
One may be left wondering, however, about the “judicial safeguards” 
of federalism. If the sharing of decisionmaking authority protects states and 
encourages better decisions in the political branches, it would seem that the 
same principle should apply to judicial decisionmaking. The state and 
federal judicial branches, after all, are every bit as intertwined as the state 
and federal legislatures, and far more so than state and federal executives. 
If the essence of federalism is that state actors must be given due respect 
within these spheres, then the suggestion that federal courts should consider 
borrowing state constitutional doctrine seems, if anything, too modest. 
 
object”). 
 102. Howard, supra note 45, at 879 (concluding, after reviewing state constitutional law regarding 
economic regulation, criminal procedure, religion, education, environment, and “autonomy and 
lifestyles,” that “[t]he picture . . . goes far in giving empirical vindication to the textbook portrait of the 
states in the Federal Union as vehicles for experimentation, with their achievements and their mistakes 
available for others to study”). 
 103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 258 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) (“In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two 
distinct [state and federal] governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct 
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”). 
 104. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 176–
90 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).  
 105. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–54 (1985). 
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This is not to suggest that current federal doctrine totally neglects state 
courts and state constitutions. But rather than encourage federal courts to 
engage directly with state constitutional law, present doctrine tends to 
adopt a much more categorical approach, requiring federal courts in certain 
situations to respect state law by avoiding it. Abstention principles do this 
by requiring federal courts to avoid hearing state court cases or state law 
claims.106 Perhaps the most easily recognizable of these is the independent 
and adequate state grounds rule, pursuant to which federal courts will 
decline to reverse the decision of a state court, even if it is based on an 
incorrect interpretation of federal law, so long as there are sufficient 
reasons for the decision that are grounded in state law.107  
This line-drawing reflects a “dualist” vision of federalism. Under that 
view, states and the federal government are sovereign and independent in 
their own spheres, and the primary function of federalism jurisprudence is 
to maintain the boundary between them.108 As effectuated in the 
“federalism revolution” associated with the Rehnquist Court, this often 
meant limiting federal power and protecting the power of states.109 
Jurisdictional rules that discourage state and federal courts from jointly 
addressing common constitutional issues make sense under this dualist 
vision because they preserve separate roles for state and federal courts. 
Such rules keep them from stepping on each other’s toes by preventing 
them from dancing at all. 
But many have begun to question whether the dualist vision is 
accurate as a descriptive matter or desirable as a normative one. Robert 
Schapiro, for example, explores what he calls “polyphonic federalism”110—
 
 106. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–21 
(1976) (allowing abstention in cases of parallel litigation); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52–54 
(1971) (requiring, with limited exceptions, federal courts to abstain from hearing civil rights tort claims 
arising from criminal prosecution until the plaintiff/defendant is convicted); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315, 333–34 (1943) (allowing federal abstention when state courts have greater expertise in the 
matter); R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–502 (1941) (holding that in most cases 
federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of a state law until state courts have had a 
reasonable opportunity to do so). 
 107. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (describing this as a “settled 
rule”).  
 108. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (describing the idea of “Our Federalism” as “the belief that the 
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 
separate functions in their separate ways”). 
 109. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7–8 (2001) 
(describing the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s 
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (describing the same development as a “Federalist 
Revival”). 
 110. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 
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a federalism that “achieves its goals not through the separation of state and 
national power, but through their interaction.”111 That approach to 
federalism, it turns out, may well be a truer description of current practice 
and also a more attractive aspiration. Rather than seeing state and federal 
governments as fully independent entities, such theories cast them, in 
Gardner’s words, as parts of an “interlocking plan of federalism devised 
collectively by the people of the nation and maintained by them as part of a 
comprehensive plan designed to serve the overriding national purpose of 
protecting the liberty of all Americans.”112 
If respecting federalism means more than simply drawing lines 
between state and federal court judgments, then abstention-type rules that 
quarantine the courts are not ideal. What is needed instead is an approach 
under which state and federal courts are not hermetically sealed off from 
each other, but rather partners in a shared enterprise of articulating 
constitutional values. Federal utilization of state constitutional law has the 
potential to do just that. Rather than simply insulating state court decisions 
from federal review, it would encourage federal courts to give increased 
consideration to state constitutional law, even in federal cases. Although 
this would require a more nuanced approach than the current rules of 
abstention, it would not be contrary to their general purposes. That is, if 
federalism is an adequate justification for requiring federal courts to avoid 
disturbing state court judgments, it would seem to follow that federalism 
principles might similarly require federal courts to be attuned to general 
state court doctrine even in cases governed by federal law. State courts, in 
other words, should be able to have a more generalized but less rigid 
impact on federal constitutional law—not just displacing it in those areas in 
which federal courts defer to state adjudication, but systematically 
influencing it whenever state and federal courts face similar constitutional 
questions. 
State courts appear to be holding up their end of this arrangement 
(perhaps with too much enthusiasm) by borrowing heavily from federal 
doctrine. Federal courts, on the other hand, generally are not. And if the 
vision of federalism as a shared constitutional enterprise is to be effectuated 
in doctrine, federal courts should take better account of their cousins.  
 
CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1999) (defending “a robust role for federal courts in interpreting state 
constitutions”). 
 111. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 316 
(2005). 
 112. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1005. 
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2.  An “Objective” Measure of Current Constitutional Values 
The relationship between contemporary, popular constitutional values 
and constitutional doctrine has long bedeviled Justices and scholars. Some 
argue that the former should be irrelevant to the latter,113 others that the two 
are intertwined,114 and others that the latter is (and should be) meaningfully 
influenced by the former.115 
Assuming for the moment that the search for contemporary 
constitutional values is a worthy enterprise, at least in some cases, it 
nonetheless faces evidentiary obstacles. Article V of the Constitution 
provides one way for the people to make their constitutional views heard, 
but its requirements are so rigid and cumbersome that formal amendments 
are, at best, an extremely rough barometer for current constitutional 
values.116 How, then, is one to know what the people think about a 
constitutional issue? The Court has no power to “certify” a question to the 
American people, and it seems unsatisfactory—base, even—to rely on 
polling data. Statutory enactments are a better measure, perhaps, since they 
arguably provide a more “objective” indicator of the current will of the 
people, as effectuated by their elected officials. And indeed the Court has 
often relied on state legislative enactments when charting the bounds of its 
due process, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.117 
But even assuming that state legislatures’ views can be tallied (an 
assumption the Court frequently makes118), if the Constitution is interpreted 
according to state legislative enactments, how can it prevent state 
legislatures from overreaching? 
What is needed is some middle ground between the rigidity of the 
Article V process and the fuzziness of public polling. State constitutional 
law can help provide that middle ground. As the formal constitutive 
 
 113. Cf. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 426, 
at 326 (5th ed. 1891) (“[T]he policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or the policy of another. The 
Constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent 
construction. It should be, so far at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the passions 
or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.”).  
 114. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court is deeply engaged with, and rarely strays far from, public opinion). 
 115. Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) (“The question we pursue, therefore, is how the 
nation can strike a viable balance between the rule of law and the people’s authority to speak to issues 
of constitutional meaning.”). 
 116. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the amendment process). 
 117. See Hills, supra note 8, at 17–18. 
 118. Id. 
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documents of the sovereign states, state constitutions are not as hard to 
amend as the federal Constitution,119 but are usually harder to alter than a 
statute is to pass.120 Similarly, the decisions of elected state judges—who, 
unlike the Justices, have a formal incentive to follow “th’ iliction 
returns”121—are likely to be at least a rough approximation of the 
constitutional values of their states’ citizens, since state supreme court 
justices can be voted out of office if they deviate too far from those values. 
State constitutions may be a particularly good measure of public 
values when they are amended or reinterpreted in response to a Supreme 
Court decision. This is not an uncommon occurrence, and at times the 
Supreme Court has taken note of it. After the Court held in Bowers v. 
Hardwick that a Georgia law prohibiting sodomy was not unconstitutional 
under the federal Due Process Clause,122 the Georgia courts found that the 
law violated Georgia’s analogous constitutional provision.123 Other states 
followed suit, some by amending their constitutions and some through 
court decisions.124 Of course, the matter could have come to rest right 
there, since states are free to protect more or different rights than the 
federal Constitution. But when the Supreme Court reversed Bowers fewer 
than twenty years later in Lawrence v. Texas,125 it specifically relied on the 
states’ constitutional response as a barometer of whether the right at issue 
was “fundamental.”126 Thus, where the constitutional inquiry itself 
demands some measure of current values—as modern due process doctrine 
arguably does—state constitutional law may be a useful evidentiary tool. 
State courts can therefore partner with federal courts in the shared project 
 
 119. Cf. Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1574 (2009) (“Today, forty-
two of the fifty state constitutions provide for the individual right to keep and bear arms unrelated to 
militia service—by far the best expression of the constitutional commitments of We the People.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 120. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 121. Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Does the Supreme Court Follow the Economic Returns? 
A Response to a Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1759 (2009) (quoting FINLEY PETER 
DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901)). 
 122. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189–96 (1986). 
 123. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998). 
 124. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 349–54 (Ark. 2002); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 
842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Ky. 1992); Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Att’y Gen., 763 N.E.2d 38, 
40–41 (Mass. 2002); Williams v. State, 722 A.2d 886 (Md. 1999) (holding at the trial court level that 
sodomy statute did not apply to consensual, noncommercial, private sexual behavior, and the decision 
was not appealed by the State); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 123–26 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. 
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260–66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 204–05 
(Tex. App. 1992). 
 125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 126. Id. at 576. 
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of identifying and expounding constitutional values.127 
Even those who are skeptical of relying on contemporary 
constitutional values would surely agree that state constitutional 
amendments can be a better gauge of those values than, say, Gallup 
polls.128 Even so, one might reasonably question how much weight state 
constitutional doctrine should receive. It has been reported that a majority 
of Americans are not even aware that their states have constitutions, much 
less what they contain.129 If that is so, then it can hardly be said that those 
constitutions reflect their values in any meaningful way. And yet it would 
also be too much to conclude that citizens are indifferent to state 
constitutional law or state courts. For evidence that people are perfectly 
willing and able to engage with state constitutional law when it touches on 
an issue that matters to them, one need look no further than the public 
outcry in response to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision 
validating same-sex marriage,130 the purge of the California Supreme Court 
after the justices on that court were labeled “soft on crime” in the 1980s,131 
or the Iowa elections in which three of the justices who extended 
constitutional protection to gay marriage in 2009 were voted out of 
office.132 To the degree that citizens actively engage with state 
constitutional law issues, state constitutional law should serve as a 
relatively accurate barometer of their current constitutional values. 
3.  Comparativism 
Finally, the simplest argument for federal borrowing of state 
constitutional law may be that it is a near-ideal form of comparative 
constitutionalism. 
 
 127. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword, State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the 
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 973 (1985) (“The idea that constitutional 
judges throughout the United States are engaged in a common enterprise, are colleagues in the effort to 
shape and explicate a common tradition of political morality, is an attractive one.”). 
 128. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he views of 
professional and religious organizations and the results of opinion polls are irrelevant.”). 
 129. Gardner, supra note 33, at 829 (citation omitted). 
 130. See Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima, Hearts Beat Fast to Opening Strains of the Gay-Wedding 
March, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, § 1, at 26; Alan Cooperman, Massachusetts Clergy Are Divided on 
Eve of Historic Same-Sex Unions, WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at A01; John McElhenny, Church 
Groups Rally on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2004, at B3. 
 131. See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The 
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987) 
(describing the debate and surrounding events leading up to the election). 
 132. See Krissah Thompson, Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Iowa Judges, Politicizing Rulings on 
Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010. 
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Comparativism has long been a part of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretive toolkit, perhaps increasingly so in recent years. For example, 
the Court has often relied on international and foreign law in Eighth 
Amendment cases, beginning with its seminal decision in Trop v. Dulles133 
and continuing through its more recent decisions in Atkins v. Virginia134 
and Roper v. Simmons.135 International comparativism has also become a 
part of the Court’s due process jurisprudence. In Lawrence v. Texas,136 for 
example, the majority noted that the European Court of Human Rights had 
recently struck down the United Kingdom’s sodomy ban in Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom.137 The Supreme Court observed that “[o]ther nations, too, 
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”138 This kind 
of international comparativism is thought to be especially useful when the 
comparator countries have constitutional systems similar to ours.139 As 
Justice Breyer has noted, the “Court has long considered as relevant and 
informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly 
comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable 
circumstances.”140 And even when it comes to countries whose traditions 
differ from ours, foreign constitutional precedents may be relevant to 
federal constitutional interpretation “simply because of the enormous value 
in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of 
others.”141 
Comparativism is also prevalent among the states themselves. State 
courts often cite one another’s decisions142 and borrow one another’s 
 
 133. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 134. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 135. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 136. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
 137. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981). 
 138. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. See also id. at 573. 
 139. See, e.g., William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, in 14 GERMANY 
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 
(Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded 
in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other 
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.”). 
 140. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 141. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003). See also 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (“[T]here is 
much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the same difficult issues that 
we face here.”). 
 142. See also Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State 
Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 179–80 (1985) (surveying scholarly studies on the 
interactions among courts of different states); Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A 
Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 796–97 (1981) (summarizing data regarding state 
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doctrine,143 even in constitutional cases.144 They do so despite the fact that 
they are no more bound by one another’s precedents when interpreting their 
own law than the Supreme Court is when interpreting federal law. Thus, 
the federal courts borrow from international sources, state courts borrow 
freely from one another, and—as noted above—state courts borrow from 
federal courts. What is largely missing, however, is intranational 
borrowing by federal courts. If international law can be a valid comparator, 
then why not also the law of those sovereign states whose constitutional 
tradition is historically, culturally, and formally enmeshed with the 
nation’s?145 
Of course, comparativism is controversial. Those opposed to its 
international variant—including, perhaps most vocally, Justice Scalia146—
complain that it amounts to substituting other countries’ views for our own, 
and imports principles from countries whose constitutional traditions 
(assuming that they exist) are very different from ours. But these arguments 
against comparativism are far weaker when American state constitutions 
are the subject of the comparison, because “the differences between the 
relevant state constitutions and the federal Constitution are much smaller 
than the differences involved in the transnational comparisons that are a 
staple of comparative constitutional law.”147 As described in more detail in 
Part II, state constitutions—and the state courts’ gloss on them—are often 
 
court citations). See generally Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 835 (1997) (examining state court references to constitutions of other states); Bradley C. 
Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion 
Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975 (1981) (using statistical methods to study the 
diffusion of state judicial doctrines). 
 143. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in 
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 285 (1997) (noting that state supreme court justices 
have become “seasoned comparatists”). 
 144. Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children”: 
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633, 1641–42 
(2004) (“As a state court judge, I have frequent occasion to look to the constitutional law of fifty other 
American jurisdictions, even though other states’ interpretations of their constitutions have no 
precedential weight for Massachusetts.”). 
 145. See Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International Human 
Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 374 (2006) (comparing federal citation of international 
materials and state court citation of other states’ decisions); Note, State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty 
Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1672 (2007) (questioning 
“the disparate attitudes toward the Court’s use of state and foreign law”). 
 146. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic 
premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”); Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 
1119 (1996) (arguing against reliance on “international norms”). 
 147. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
357, 359. 
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substantially identical to the federal Constitution. Indeed, “The 
development of individual rights under [state] Bills of Rights has been a 
cooperative, common law–like effort by federal and state courts.”148 If that 
development is to be truly cooperative, then federal courts should do more 
to take into account interpretations of the state courts with which they are 
supposedly cooperating.  
B.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
The purpose of this Article is not to present a unified theory of 
constitutional interpretation, but to consider carefully whether one 
particular interpretive tool is worthwhile, and under what circumstances. 
This section therefore aims to evaluate the arguments against increased 
federal reliance on state constitutional law. 
1.  Conflicts with Originalism, Textualism, and Positivism 
It would appear that originalists and textualists are unlikely to have 
much interest in using contemporary state constitutional doctrine to 
illuminate the federal document.149 Strict originalists focus on the intent, 
understandings, and practices in place when the federal Constitution was 
written and ratified.150 The modern constitutional practices of states—
particularly those states that did not even exist in the late 1700s—are 
therefore presumably irrelevant except perhaps to the degree that they 
elucidate or rely on Founding-era materials. Textualists, in turn, focus on 
specific words in the federal Constitution, and often do so through an 
originalist lens by looking for Founding-era sources151 or contextual clues 
within the federal Constitution itself.152 Again, contemporary state 
 
 148. Force, supra note 42, at 130. 
 149. State Law as “Other Law,” supra note 145, at 1681 (“Under originalism, both contemporary 
state and foreign sources are likely irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.”). 
 150. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990) (“All that counts is how the 
words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time. The original understanding is 
thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates at the conventions, public 
discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.”); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–52 (1989) (explaining that the “‘originalist’ 
approach to constitutional interpretation” includes “examining various evidence, including not only, of 
course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, but also the contemporaneous 
understanding . . . , the background understanding . . . under the English constitution, and . . . the 
various state constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted”). 
 151. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 984 (2009) 
(citing textualist use of Founding-era materials).  
 152. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788–801 (1999) (describing 
the theory of “intratextualism,” under which the meaning of constitutional text is established in part by 
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constitutional law seems unlikely to offer much useful guidance. 
More generally, objections to constitutional borrowing of any kind 
may be grounded in a certain view of legal positivism, a concept that has 
made frequent appearances in debates about state constitutionalism. 
Gardner explains that positivism “requires courts to approach a constitution 
as an authoritative expression of the will of the people who made it, and to 
interpret the constitution strictly in accordance with that popular will as it is 
expressed in the document.”153 In other words, one cannot compare state 
constitutional apples to the federal orange, because they were produced by 
different sets of “the people.” Invoking this principle, some scholars and 
judges argue that state constitutions are unique and must be interpreted in 
light of their specific texts, original intents and original understandings,154 
or in line with the character of the states themselves,155 rather than in 
accordance with federal constitutional principles. One could easily turn the 
argument around to say that federal courts should not borrow state law for 
precisely the same reasons.  
 
uses of other, similar language elsewhere in the document). 
 153. James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism 
Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2005). 
 154. See Gardner, supra note 153, at 1246 (“Sometimes a jurisprudence of state constitutional 
positivism is justified on the ground that, because state constitutions are so easily and frequently 
amended, it is often possible to discern ‘the framers’ true intent’ in a way that is sometimes impossible 
to accomplish when interpreting the U.S. Constitution due to its age.” (footnote omitted)); Howard, 
supra note 45, at 936 (“A state’s history and traditions should be considered. Early events often throw 
considerable light on constitutional interpretation in states tending to strict separation of church and 
state.”); Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State 
Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 640 (1994) (“[S]tate judges sometimes justify deviant 
interpretations of rights by arguing that the drafters of relevant state provisions had different intentions 
from those of the federal framers.”); G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Interpretation, 8 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 357, 357 (2004) (“The interpretation of state constitutions, like the interpretation of the federal 
Constitution, should be rooted in the text and original understanding of the document.”).  
 155. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 965 (1982) (“I 
look at the peculiarities of my state—its land, its industry, its people, its history.”); Judith S. Kaye, Dual 
Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 399, 423 (1987) (“It should be 
immediately apparent that the Constitution established by New York . . . reflects its own values, which 
may or may not be identical to those held elsewhere.”); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last 
Frontier,” Professor Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 
12 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1995) (outlining Alaska’s unique history and traditions); Peter R. Teachout, 
Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State 
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 35 (1988) (“The keystone is the development in each state of a 
jurisprudence that is faithful to that state’s particular constitutional traditions.”); Don S. Willner, 
Constitutional Interpretation in a Pioneer and Populist State, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 757, 777–78 
(1981) (outlining the distinctive qualities of Oregon that should influence its jurisprudence). See 
generally R. Lawrence Hachey, Jacksonian Democracy and the Wisconsin Constitution, 62 MARQ. L. 
REV. 485 (1979) (describing the origins of the Wisconsin Constitution). 
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Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that the originalist, textualist, 
and positivist objections are not necessarily devastating. Even the most 
committed originalists and textualists use Framing-era state constitutions to 
interpret the federal document.156 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Heller—which has been called the leading originalist opinion the Court has 
ever issued157—does so,158 as does Justice Alito’s originalist opinion for 
the plurality in McDonald.159 This makes perfect sense, of course, given 
that the federal Constitution was modeled on state constitutions, rather than 
the other way around.160 Moreover, just as originalists often look to 
scholarship for illumination of original intents or understandings, so too 
might they turn to state court decisions that are themselves originalist.161 
The originalist and textualist objections to reliance on state law therefore 
may not be quite as unqualified as they first appear. 
The positivist objection, too, can be partially answered. As an 
argument against federal borrowing of state constitutional law, the 
positivist objection fails for the simple reason that the federal system is not 
independent of state constitutional law. That is, the federal Constitution—
both in its explicit terms and in the constitutional culture it creates—is 
deeply intertwined with state constitutions and state constitutionalism. The 
will of “the people” who made the federal Constitution, as expressed in that 
document, is emphatically one that respects states and state identity. 
Indeed, the federal Constitution and all of its amendments were ratified by 
the states, not directly by “the people.” Because state constitutions are 
deeply intertwined with the federal Constitution—they inspired it and are 
modeled after it—comparativism cannot be ruled out on the basis of the 
 
 156. Scalia, supra note 150, at 852. See also Powell, supra note 50, at 283 (“[B]oth legal history 
and constitutional jurisprudence would benefit from enhanced attention to those traditions of argument 
and interpretation that center on the fundamental law of the several states rather than on the federal 
Constitution.”). See generally LUTZ, supra note 14 (arguing that understanding the U.S. Constitution 
requires understanding state constitutions). 
 157. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). See also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News 
Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s 
opinion is the finest example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever 
adopted by the Supreme Court.”). 
 158. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (interpreting the Second Amendment’s first clause as “prefatory” 
in light of the fact that “other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individual-rights 
provisions of state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement of purpose”); id. at 640–42 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 159. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037–38 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 160. See LUTZ, supra note 14, at 97. 
 161. See, e.g., State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1005 (Wash. 2010) (“We follow Heller . . . [and] 
look to the Second Amendment’s original meaning, the traditional understanding of the right, and the 
burden imposed on children by upholding the statute.”). 
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documents’ supposed independence from each other. 
2.  The “Political” Nature of State Constitutional Law 
Holding aside for a moment the differences in substantive rights 
guaranteed by state constitutions and the federal Constitution—an issue 
described in more detail in the following subsection—there are also 
important differences in their political responsiveness. The federal 
Constitution, of course, is largely impervious to political concerns. 
Amending it requires ratification by three quarters of the states, which is, of 
course, an extremely high bar.162 And although Supreme Court Justices 
may in fact tend to stay within the political mainstream,163 Article III 
formally insulates them from politics by guaranteeing life tenure and 
nondiminution of salary.164 This entrenchment leads to the most famous 
constitutional “difficulty” of all—the countermajoritarian one—but it is 
also essential to the Constitution’s role in protecting unpopular groups and 
rights. 
State constitutional law, by contrast, is not nearly so far removed from 
politics, and therefore one might reasonably question whether it should 
serve as a model for the federal Constitution. This overarching concern can 
be divided into two arguments: state constitutions are too easily amended, 
and state court judges are too politically responsive.  
a.  State Constitutions Are Too Easily Amended 
The biggest difference between state constitutions and their federal 
counterpart might lie not in the rights they protect, but in the relative ease 
with which the former can be amended, altered, or replaced. This 
malleability, in turn, contributes to further substantive differences between 
the documents. 
In contrast to the rigid requirements of Article V, state constitutions 
can be amended through a wide array of methods, including popular 
initiative,165 convention, constitutional commission,166 and legislative 
 
 162. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 163. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 114 (describing tensions that result in balance between 
majoritarian values and judicial review). 
 164. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 165. See generally DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE 
REVOLUTION (1989) (describing the political trends and events that led to a much wider use of voter-
initiated propositions nationwide beginning in the 1970s). 
 166. Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing 
Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 
1, 22–26 (1996) (analyzing the rise in the use of constitutional commissions, and concluding that they 
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proposal.167 Those mechanisms have been frequently employed to amend 
state constitutions and even to replace them entirely. By Alan Tarr’s count, 
“Only nineteen states retain their original constitutions, and most states 
have had three or more.”168 Although a dozen state constitutions predated 
the federal Constitution, only three states—Massachusetts, Vermont, and 
New Hampshire—still have the constitutions they adopted in the eighteenth 
century.169 Fifteen state constitutions were adopted in the final twenty-five 
years of the 1800s, and eighteen more were adopted after 1900.170 As of 
thirty years ago, the states had created a total of at least 145 
constitutions.171 
Even when state constitutions are not replaced entirely, they are 
amended with dizzying frequency. According to one estimate, there were 
4700 state constitutional amendments between 1776 and 1980.172 It should 
be noted, though, that a handful of states bear disproportionate 
responsibility for those numbers. By 1982, the Alabama Constitution had 
been amended more than 500 times, the California and South Carolina 
Constitutions each more than 400 times, and the Texas Constitution more 
than 200 times.173 If anything, the pace has accelerated since then. By 
2006, Alabama was up to 772 amendments, California to 514, South 
Carolina to 485, and Texas to 432.174 But they are by no means the only 
states to amend their constitutions frequently; most have averaged more 
than one amendment per year of their existence.175 
To the degree that state constitutions can be altered on a whim, they 
 
“may also provide a fourth means to propose constitutional change directly to the people, in addition to 
the convention, the legislative route, or (where it exists) the initiative process”). 
 167. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 334–35 (2010) (summarizing 
the four methods of state constitutional amendment). Variations exist. Delaware allows for amendments 
solely by the General Assembly, DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, and Florida allows for a constitution 
revision commission to meet every twenty years and propose amendments, FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.  
 168. Tarr, supra note 154, at 359 (citing TARR, supra note 40, at 23). 
 169. Gardner, supra note 33, at 811 (citing Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State 
Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 75–76 (1982)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Sturm, supra note 170, at 57.  
 172. James A. Henretta, Foreword, Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS 
L.J. 819, 829 (1991) (citation omitted).  
 173. Gardner, supra note 33, at 820 (citing Sturm, supra note 169, at 75–76 tbl.3).  
 174. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, at xxxiii–xxxvii 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 175. Tarr, supra note 154, at 359 (citing TARR, supra note 40, at 24). See also Janice C. May, 
Amending State Constitutions 1996–97, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1025 (1999) (noting that from 1996 to 
1997 alone, forty-two states considered 233 amendments, approving 178 of them (citation omitted)). 
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may not accurately reflect entrenched constitutional values. But this is the 
inevitable tradeoff between timelessness and timeliness. State constitutions 
tend toward the latter; the federal Constitution toward the former. Each has 
its advantages and disadvantages. For example, whenever federal 
constitutional interpretation requires consideration of contemporary values, 
the ease with which state constitutions can be amended may in fact make 
them a valuable and accurate barometer.176 Robert Williams notes that 
“proposed amendments to state constitutions sometimes provide a forum 
for resolving major societal conflicts.”177 Because they have been amended 
so often, state constitutions contain a “layering” of different generations’ 
constitutional concerns.178 As A.E. Dick Howard explains, “State 
constitutions are a peculiarly useful mirror of fundamental values.”179 
b.  State Judges Are Elected 
There is a second potential problem with the “political” nature of state 
constitutional law, one that springs not from the constitutions themselves 
but from the manner in which state judges are selected. Because many state 
judges are elected, and therefore politically responsive in ways that their 
federal counterparts are not, they may bend in the wind too much to serve 
as trustworthy and steady evaluators of constitutional rights. 
The problems raised by judicial elections have been well covered 
elsewhere and need not be rehashed in any detail here.180 In general, 
however, it would seem that if state judges are attuned to the whims of the 
popular electorate, then they will tend to underprotect unpopular rights and 
unpopular groups. And while it may be true that most voters, most of the 
time, do not know or care who their state judges are, they are nonetheless 
capable of mobilizing whenever the courts stray too far from majority 
public opinion in defense of unpopular people or principles. Perhaps the 
most well-known example is the bitter and successful campaign against 
Chief Justice Rose Bird and her colleagues on the California Supreme 
Court after they struck down California’s death penalty statute and were 
 
 176. Howard, supra note 45, at 938–39.  
 177. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 176 
(1983). 
 178. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (2d ed. 
1993).  
 179. Howard, supra note 45, at 938–39. 
 180. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 287–89 
(2008). For a nuanced account of state courts’ treatment of “backlash,” see Neal Devins, How State 
Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State 
Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629 (2010). 
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generally accused of coddling criminals.181 Other examples are not hard to 
find.182 State judges trying to avoid a similar fate may feel pressured to 
adopt federal constitutional law as their own.183 As Justin Long notes, “The 
public, not knowing (or caring) much about state constitutions or state high 
courts, sees only a state court refusing to follow precedent from ‘the 
highest court in the land,’ and by that refusal, protecting a disfavored 
group’s rights over the wishes of the electoral majority.”184 
These political considerations raise concerns about federal borrowing 
of state constitutional law. Most importantly, they suggest that “reverse 
incorporating” state constitutional law—which for all the reasons listed 
above is likely to underprotect rights—would effectively weaken federal 
constitutional protections.185 One response to this concern might be to say 
that state constitutional underprotection should not be a problem because 
state constitutional protections cannot fall below the federal “floor.” But 
that move, attractive as it may be, is not available. If state constitutional 
law is used to define the federal constitutional floor, then it is no answer to 
say that the federal floor will prevent underprotection by states. 
There are other ways to minimize the problem, however. It is possible 
that the political accountability of state judges (and the amendability of 
state constitutions) might encourage them to read state constitutions more 
expansively, knowing that their rulings can always be “corrected” by a 
democratic majority.186 Moreover, for precisely the same reasons that the 
 
 181. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 182. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 81, at 34–36. 
 183. Cf. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 815–16 (N.J. 1990) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (objecting 
to the court’s divergence from Supreme Court doctrine and arguing that “[t]o the extent possible, we 
ought not personalize constitutional doctrine. When we do otherwise, we vindicate the worst fears of 
the critics of judicial activism”). 
 184. Long, supra note 83, at 65–66. See also Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra 
note 4, at 368 (“[S]tate courts now face mounting criticism for reaching ‘result-oriented’ decisions. 
Without more of a justification, state courts may face criticism regardless of the persuasiveness of their 
state constitutional analysis.”); Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional 
Doctrines: Case-By-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 
1525 (2005) [hereinafter Williams, State Courts] (“When two sets of interpreters reach the same 
outcome in a constitutional case, this increases confidence that the result is rooted in law rather than in 
will.” (quoting TARR, supra note 40, at 175–76)).  
 185. Those who believe that federal constitutional rights are already too expansive are unlikely to 
be troubled by this, of course. 
 186. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694 (Mass. 1975) (Hennessey, J., 
concurring) (“[I]f the present will of the people of the Commonwealth is that capital punishment should 
be permitted in some or all cases of murder in the first degree, procedures for amendment of the State 
Constitution which are relatively speedy, but still require time for reasonable reflection, are available to 
accomplish that end.”); Schapiro, supra note 110, at 1453 (“[T]heir greater accountability might render 
state judges more willing to read state constitutional guarantees expansively.”); Robert S. Thompson, 
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malleability of state constitutions makes them particularly good markers of 
current constitutional values, so too should the electability of state judges 
make them especially accurate expositors of those values. Their articulation 
of constitutional values may well lead to a “reinvigoration of the discursive 
ground of a democratic order committed to the rule of law,” in part because 
state courts’ “institutional position can be thought of as intermediate 
between that of federal judges and that of elected representatives.”187  
3.  The Impossibility or Unhelpfulness of Comparison 
A final group of objections centers on the basic idea that it is either 
unhelpful or impossible to compare state and federal constitutions.  
a.  State Constitutions Are Too Different 
One argument against using state constitutional law to guide federal 
constitutional interpretation is that state constitutions simply have too little 
in common—either with the federal Constitution188 or with one 
another189—for comparisons to be illuminating.  
It is undoubtedly true that state constitutions differ from the federal 
Constitution in the rights they protect. As noted above, state constitutions 
generally protect at least the same rights as are listed in the federal Bill of 
Rights. But some employ different and more elaborate language in doing 
so.190 And in addition to those rights, state constitutions also typically 
guarantee other rights not mentioned in the federal document.191 For 
example, “every state constitution dwells at length on education, and most 
have something to say about conservation and the environment; the federal 
 
Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election 
of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2055 (1988) (“Subjecting state appellate judges to electoral 
accountability conceivably justifies these judges in erring more freely on the side of overprotection.”). 
 187. Kahn, supra note 75, at 1155–56. See generally David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as 
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010) (arguing that election of state judges may 
serve as a mechanism of popular constitutionalism).  
 188. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 272 (“[S]tate constitutions differ fundamentally from the federal 
constitution in their respective histories, their political theories, and the intra-state circumstances to 
which they respond, if imperfectly, as instruments of public governance.”).  
 189. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 583, 586 (1986) (“State constitutions thus exhibit much greater diversity in origin and in 
agenda—some were intended, for example, to facilitate acceptance into the union—than we are 
accustomed to contemplate from a federal vantage point.”(footnote omitted)). 
 190. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 45, at 910 (“Religion clauses in state constitutions take many 
forms. Some parallel the First Amendment. More commonly, they are both longer and more detailed 
than the First Amendment.”). 
 191. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1028–29. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution mentions neither.”192 Indeed, federal constitutional law all but 
disavows any government obligation to ensure or protect such rights. 
In addition to the breadth of the rights they protect, state constitutions 
are almost statute-like in their length and attention to detail. One commonly 
invoked piece of evidence in this regard is the New York Constitution’s 
direct regulation of the width of ski trails.193 The original, unamended 
federal Constitution, by contrast, consists of fewer than 5000 words, 
including signatures, and a vast amount of federal legislative authority 
derives from only seven of them (“To regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States”).194 Given their detail, it is unsurprising that, on average, 
state constitutions are four times longer than the federal Constitution.195 
And even holding aside differences in particularities, federal and state 
constitutions are differently situated for the simple reason that state and 
federal governments are. The federal government, of course, can act only 
pursuant to its enumerated powers, while states have the police power and 
can act unless prohibited. The federal Constitution therefore grants power; 
state constitutions limit it.196  
These are important differences and should not be minimized. And yet 
there are still areas of overlap. Although state constitutions may go much 
further than the federal Constitution in terms of the rights they enumerate 
and protect, they do tend to protect at least the same rights as the federal 
Constitution. That, after all, is precisely the reason why state courts are able 
to interpret their constitutions in “lockstep” with the federal Constitution. 
And even where state constitutions differ in substance or detail from their 
federal counterpart, a careful interpretive approach can take these 
differences into account. For example, the right to privacy exists in the 
federal system as an incident of substantive due process. Some states, 
however, have adopted specific constitutional provisions to protect the 
right, rather than relying on due process.197 Thus, a federal court looking to 
state constitutional doctrine to determine whether the right to privacy is 
 
 192. Howard, supra note 45, at 935.  
 193. Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1 
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17, 18–19 (1988) (discussing N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).  
 194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 195. Sturm, supra note 169, at 74, 75–76 tbl.3. 
 196. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 277 (“State constitutions are documents of limits, while the 
federal constitution is a document of grant.”); Williams, supra note 177, at 178 (“State constitutions are 
usually contrasted with their federal counterpart by characterizing the former as limits on governmental 
power rather than grants of power.”). 
 197. Linde, supra note 5, at 182 (noting that by 1984, eleven states had specific constitutional 
privacy guarantees). 
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“fundamental” would need to look not only to states’ due process 
jurisprudence, but also to other provisions in their constitutions. In other 
words, state constitutional rights that lack federal analogues are not 
necessarily irrelevant. They may simply be evidence of the kinds of rights 
that the Supreme Court should recognize as unenumerated in the federal 
Constitution.  
Finally and relatedly, state constitutional doctrine is hardly uniform, 
so for many legal questions it may be impossible to identify “what state 
constitutional law says” about a particular issue. Obviously, whenever this 
is the case, the Supreme Court need not defer to an imagined plurality or 
unanimity of state practice. And yet state constitutional doctrine does tend 
to converge over time, in part because state courts, in keeping with the 
common law tradition, tend to borrow doctrine from one another.198 The 
more they agree, the more weight their shared view should receive.199  
In any event, these objections about differences could be raised about 
comparativism of any kind. At the very least, states share a constitutional 
heritage with the nation, have similar constitutional charters, and should 
therefore be relatively good candidates for comparative study.  
b.  State Constitutions Are Not Good Enough, or State and Federal 
Judges Are Not Up to the Task 
A somewhat more pointed objection is that state constitutions and 
state judges are not “good” enough to be useful in federal constitutional 
interpretation, or that federal judges will find it impossible as a practical 
matter to divine state constitutional law or employ it in any meaningful 
way to federal constitutional interpretation.  
It has often been argued that state judges are simply not as trustworthy 
as their federal counterparts when it comes to the protection of 
constitutional rights, in part because—as Part III.B.2 explains—they are 
more subject to political pressures. Some version of this argument lies at 
the heart of the debate associated with Burt Neuborne’s article “The Myth 
of Parity,”200 which was published in the same volume of the Harvard Law 
 
 198. Gardner & Rossi, supra note 60, at 1231 (“A borrowing mentality emerged, as courts looked 
outside of their jurisdictional territories to state constitutions to fill gaps in constitutional 
interpretation.”). 
 199. See Gardner, supra note 40, at 1037 (“The more state courts agree among themselves, the 
more influence their collective position may have upon federal reasoning in cases arising under the U.S. 
Constitution.”).  
 200. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Michael E. 
Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457 (2005).  
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Review as Justice Brennan’s ode to state courts.201 Neuborne dismissed the 
“assumption of parity” between state and federal courts as a “dangerous 
myth,”202 pointing to state judges’ “vulnerab[ility] to majoritarian 
pressure.”203 
State constitutional law may be subject to the same criticism. In a 
controversial but influential article, Gardner described what he called the 
“Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,” arguing that a theory of state 
constitutional interpretation was practically impossible and normatively 
undesirable.204 Daniel Rodriguez adds that “[s]tate constitutional theory 
remains a rather barren, mundane field, with little substantive controversy, 
creative thinking, or paradigm-shaking.”205 And even those who disagree 
with Gardner’s normative conclusions tend to agree with his descriptive 
diagnosis.206 According to Hans A. Linde, 
Most state constitutions are dusty stuff—too much detail, too much 
diversity, too much debris of old tempests in local teapots, too much 
preoccupation with offices, their composition and administration, and 
forever with money, money, money. In short, no grand vision, no 
overarching theory, nothing to tempt a scholar aspiring to national 
recognition.207 
Coming from a former state supreme court justice who supports a robust 
system of state constitutional law, this is quite an indictment. 
Moreover, just as state judges may be disfavored when it comes to 
protecting constitutional rights and articulating a constitutional vision, 
federal judges may be incompetent to utilize state law. Federal judges and 
their law clerks are not likely to be experts in any state’s law, even though 
diversity jurisdiction requires them to utilize it.208 And even if federal 
 
 201. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6.  
 202. Neuborne, supra note 200, at 1105.  
 203. Id. at 1127–28. 
 204. Gardner, supra note 33. But see Daniel J. Elazar, A Response to Professor Gardner’s The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 975 (1993) (criticizing Gardner); 
Schuman, supra note 59 (same). 
 205. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 271. 
 206. See, e.g., Schuman, supra note 59, at 276 (criticizing Gardner’s thesis, but noting that 
“Gardner is surely correct in his conclusion that state constitutional discourse in most jurisdictions, 
including the ones he surveys, is impoverished”). 
 207. Linde, supra note 5, at 196. 
 208. This is a problem for state judges as well, since their clerks are likely to be more familiar 
with federal law. Douglas, supra note 60, at 1147 (“The fact that law clerks working for state judges 
have only been taught or are familiar with federal cases brings a federal bias to the various states as 
they fan out after graduation from ‘federally’ oriented law schools.”); Linde, supra note 5 at 177 (“Our 
law clerks come prepared for nothing else.”). 
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judges were inclined to look to state law for guidance, they would find the 
path to be dimly lit: legal scholarship has largely remained faithful in its 
monogamist devotion to the federal Constitution. 
There are no straightforward answers to these objections. It may very 
well be the case that some state judges are incompetent, or even that, on 
average, they are less competent than their federal counterparts. But as a 
practical matter, it remains true that “under our constitutional structure it is 
the state, and not the lower federal, courts that constitute our ultimate 
guarantee that a usurping legislature and executive cannot strip us of our 
constitutional rights.”209 If state courts can be trusted alongside federal 
courts as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights, then presumably 
their efforts to articulate constitutional values are also worthy of respect. 
IV.  THE APPROACH IN PRACTICE  
A.  REVISITING AND ELABORATING THE THESIS: TOWARD A TAXONOMY 
The relative weight of these arguments for and against borrowing state 
constitutional law varies according to the constitutional question at issue 
and the interpretive theory one endorses. What is needed, therefore, is a 
taxonomy of areas for which borrowing is most likely to be appropriate, 
and some indication of how much weight it should be given. A number of 
considerations seem relevant. 
First, borrowing of state constitutional law is undoubtedly more useful 
when the states have spoken with a relatively unified voice—when their 
laboratories have come up with similar results. The standard of review for 
gun regulations, explored in more detail in Part IV.C, is a particularly 
striking example in this regard because the states have been nearly 
unanimous in endorsing a “reasonable regulations” standard of review. And 
in the three areas of constitutional law described in Part IV.B—criminal 
procedure, due process, and the Eighth Amendment—the Court has 
generally employed a kind of head-counting approach that gives more 
weight to state practice (some of it constitutional) the more widely it is 
shared. Doing so helps minimize the appearance of federal courts 
“choosing sides” when state courts disagree about constitutional principles.  
Second, state constitutional law should be more relevant to federal 
interpretation when analogous rights or issues are involved. For example, 
 
 209. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 605, 627 (1981). 
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more than thirty states have due process clauses whose wording is identical 
to the federal clause.210 Accordingly, their interpretations of those clauses 
should presumptively be entitled to more weight than those of states with 
clauses whose language differs. Depending on one’s preferred method of 
constitutional interpretation, the same could be said about other potentially 
distinctive characteristics, such as original intents or understandings. But it 
does not follow that state constitutional law should be relevant only when 
provisions are clearly analogous. As Part IV.D argues, state practice may 
be relevant to federal constitutional law even when the only “hook” is the 
federal Due Process Clause.  
Third, state constitutional law should be (and is) more properly 
influential in federal cases in which the federal doctrine itself calls for a 
survey of state practice. In due process cases, for example, the question is 
whether a particular right is “fundamental,” and state constitutional law 
provides the answer to the federal inquiry, rather than influencing the 
question itself. This is not quite the same as relying on state constitutional 
law as persuasive authority, since it essentially means counting heads 
instead of evaluating reasoning, but it does suggest a broad and important 
role for state constitutional law. 
Fourth, state constitutional law is particularly useful when federal 
courts lack necessary “practical” experience. Again, regulation of the 
“individual” right to keep and bear arms provides a useful example because 
it is a right that the states have recognized (and regulated) for far longer 
than the federal government. Accordingly, federal courts can limit their 
speculation about the particular consequences of a particular standard of 
review or legal rule by simply looking to its impact at the state level. 
Assuming that there is a valid “state” position on a constitutional 
issue, the next major question is how much weight that position should be 
accorded. That question can be answered in many ways, just as state courts 
have developed many different methods for taking federal constitutional 
law into account. At one end of the spectrum, one could imagine a system 
in which state constitutional law defines federal law. For example, if state 
courts have unanimously decided that pornography is not protected in their 
own constitutions, then the federal courts might be compelled (absent some 
extraordinary reason to the contrary) to follow suit in First Amendment 
doctrine. Or, as described in Part IV.B.3, if states are nearly unanimous in 
finding a particular punishment unconstitutional, then it could follow 
naturally that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the punishment as well. 
 
 210. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1029. 
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This approach would take the notion of “reverse incorporation” quite 
seriously—incorporation, after all, applies federal constitutional rules to the 
states, rather than simply looking to them as persuasive authority. Relaxing 
that standard slightly, federal courts might accord the states a presumption 
of correctness, as state courts sometimes do with regard to the Supreme 
Court’s rulings.211 If state courts feel the need to explain their departures 
from Supreme Court rulings212—which are no more formally binding on 
state constitutional interpretations than state court interpretations are 
binding on federal law—then perhaps it stands to reason that the Court 
should do the same when roles are reversed.  
In keeping with the taxonomy sketched out above, these strong 
versions of reverse incorporation or intranational comparativism may be 
appropriate in some areas of law but not others. For example, a unanimous 
state constitutional practice protecting a particular right would be almost 
definitive evidence that the right is “fundamental” for due process 
purposes. But such a rigid approach is likely too strong in other areas of 
law. For example, if state law is relevant only to the degree that it is 
convincing, then the uncritical adoption of state constitutional law would 
verge on an inverted version of the justly criticized “lockstep” approach 
followed by many state courts. In those areas of law, it may be more 
appropriate for state constitutional doctrine to serve as a kind of persuasive 
authority, influencing federal courts through the power of its reasoning,213 
just as federal doctrine may at times persuade state courts.214 At the very 
 
 211. See, e.g., Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (Cal. 1938) (“[C]ogent reasons must 
exist before a state court in construing a provision of the state Constitution will depart from the 
construction placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provision of the federal 
Constitution.”); Alan B. Handler, Expounding the State Constitution, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 202, 204 
(1983) (“[R]esort to the state constitution as an independent source for protecting individual rights is 
most appropriate when supported by sound reasons of state law, policy, or tradition.”).  
 212. See Developments in the Law, supra note 84, at 1357 (“When a state court diverges from the 
federal view, a reasoned explanation of the divergence may be necessary if the decision is to command 
respect.”); Friedman, supra note 51, at 109 (“[C]ommentators and jurists contend that state courts 
should defer to U.S. Supreme Court interpretations absent some principled basis for distinguishing 
otherwise textually indistinguishable constitutional provisions.”). 
 213. See Friedman, supra note 51, at 128–30 (describing advantages to robust state court 
constitutional jurisprudence as “an interpretive counterpoint to . . . U.S. Supreme Court” doctrine, as 
well as contributing to “[p]rudential interests in predictability and stability” in areas in which the Court 
has had difficulty, such as search and seizure and religious liberty). 
 214. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1059 (“The likeliest explanation [for why state courts so 
frequently copy federal constitutional doctrine] is undoubtedly the most obvious one: state judges adopt 
the Supreme Court’s approach because they like it and think that it does a perfectly adequate job of 
protecting the liberty in question.”). See also State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974) (holding 
that an “opinion of the United States Supreme Court . . . is merely another source of authority, 
admittedly to be afforded respectful consideration, but which we are free to accept or reject in 
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least, “whenever a state court dissents from the reasoning of a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, it offers a forceful and very public critique of the 
national ruling, which can in the long run influence the formation of public 
and, eventually, official opinion on the propriety of the federal ruling.”215 
Over time, the power of these state court decisions may have an impact on 
federal doctrine.216 In that way, a state court decision is somewhat akin to a 
dissent in a federal case217—it is not binding, but articulates a reasoning 
that other courts may find convincing. 
There is yet another way in which state constitutional law can be 
useful, even if it is not strictly binding. Some federal constitutional 
doctrines require the Court to identify constitutional values—for example, 
what rights are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition” as 
evidenced by “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,”218 or 
what punishments violate “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”219 In answering these inquiries, state 
constitutional law can be important not because it is binding or persuasive, 
but because it provides the answer to the question that federal doctrine 
asks. In these scenarios, state constitutional law is itself the object of study. 
Thus, where federal doctrine asks whether a right is “deeply rooted in this 
nation’s history and tradition,” the relevant evidence may be whether it 
is—not why it is. 
Drawing a line between adopting questions and adopting answers 
highlights another important distinction: that between tests and 
conclusions, or reasoning and holdings.220 As noted above, state courts 
seem perfectly comfortable borrowing the former from federal law.221 
 
establishing the outer limits of protection afforded by . . . the Hawaii Constitution”); State v. Hempele, 
576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990) (“In interpreting the New Jersey Constitution, we look for direction to 
the United States Supreme Court, whose opinions can provide ‘valuable sources of wisdom for us.’” 
(quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring))). 
 215. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1033. 
 216. See Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of Federal 
and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 729, 742 (1988) (arguing that federal decisions, to be 
fully persuasive, should take into account state court reactions to their prior decisionmaking).  
 217. Gardner, supra note 33, at 831 (“The idea of dissenting opinions furnishes a useful model for 
thinking about state constitutional variations.”). 
 218. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 219. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 220. Linde, supra note 65, at 929 (noting cases in which a state court “agrees with the Supreme 
Court’s result but rejects ‘balancing,’ more or less ‘fundamental’ rights, ‘degrees of scrutiny,’ or other 
Supreme Court clichés of the times”). 
 221. Id. at 951 (“In short, state courts seem content to copy whatever judicial formulas are in 
fashion, especially elastic formulas that let the court reach its own decision on the merits, for which the 
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Indeed, state courts have often been criticized for using the Supreme 
Court’s “verbal formulas.”222 But even when state courts borrow the 
Supreme Court’s “questions” (its constitutional tests and standards), they 
need not—and do not—answer them the same way. It may be, for example, 
that state constitutional law gives more or less weight to a particular 
government interest than federal law does, or that the interest at issue 
(public safety, for example) means more to states than it does to the federal 
government.223 As Louis Bilionis has noted, “the constitutionally 
significant facts may be different at the state and federal levels . . . . Indeed, 
whenever a constitutional methodology admits a need to accommodate 
institutional considerations, the possibility for different yet equally correct 
state and federal results exists.”224 In other words, even if the equations are 
the same, the variables—and therefore results—may not be. 
There are also other, more nuanced ways to take state constitutional 
principles into account. One is to acknowledge different standards, under 
federal law, for state and federal action225—for example, requiring federal 
gun control to satisfy strict scrutiny, but holding state gun laws to 
reasonableness review. The possibility of varying standards was bandied 
about during the incorporation debate,226 and various Justices have 
 
Supreme Court’s current formulas are eminently suited.”). 
 222. Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become 
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997) (“I want to question the uncritical 
adoption, when giving meaning to state constitutional rights, of verbal formulas that the United States 
Supreme Court uses to measure federal constitutional rights or powers.”); Gardner, supra note 33, at 
766 (noting that states have “borrowed wholesale from federal constitutional discourse, as though the 
language of federal constitutional law were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument 
generally”); Linde, supra note 65, at 943 (“Adopting timeworn verbiage in applying similar 
constitutional clauses is a venial sin . . . .”). 
 223. Cf. Linde, supra note 65, at 932 (“The diversity that the Constitution allows the states 
undercuts these formulas because it leaves state legislatures free to give strong protection to a right that 
the Court does not consider ‘fundamental’ and to disown a governmental interest that the Court has 
found ‘compelling.’”); Williams, State Courts, supra note 184, at 1514 (describing state court adoption 
of Supreme Court tests as a weaker form of lockstepping). 
 224. Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and 
Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1015, 1053 (1997) (quoting Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 1803, 1808–09 (1992)). 
 225. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005) (noting that “today’s doctrine virtually always utilizes what might be 
called a categorical ‘One-Size-Fits-All’ approach to those constitutional principles that apply to more 
than one level of government” but arguing that this approach “is problematic because the different 
levels of government—federal, state, and local—sometimes are sufficiently different that a given 
constitutional principle may apply differently to each level”).  
 226. See generally Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 
YALE L.J. 74 (1963) (suggesting standards for selective incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights 
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acknowledged it over the years.227 In some limited circumstances, the 
Court has embraced such differential standards. For a few years, states 
were held to a higher standard than the federal government with regard to 
affirmative action, for example.228 And in Apodaca v. Oregon,229 the Court 
held that a state jury’s verdict need not be unanimous in order to support a 
criminal conviction, despite the fact that federal juries must be.230 And yet, 
as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Baldwin v. New York, forty-
seven states already required unanimity for felony convictions under their 
own constitutions.231  
The thesis that federal courts should more often rely on analogous 
state law is anything but a radical normative claim, which makes it 
somewhat mysterious that it is so inaccurate as a descriptive one. One 
explanation might be that federal courts have diagnosed and are attempting 
quietly to treat our “national neurosis” about federalism232 by—at least in 
this small way—refusing to pay homage to the inflated importance of state 
identity. Despite some state judges’ insistence on state-specific 
constitutionalism,233 critics have argued that such positivism is impossible 
to maintain, since states are neither culturally unique nor legally 
autonomous. Paul Kahn, for example, argues that  
[t]o rest state constitutionalism on an idea of the state as an already-
defined historical community, with a text that can be interpreted to 
reflect the unique political identity of members of that community, is to 
try to build a serious legal doctrine on what may be no more than an 
anachronism or romantic myth.234  
 
against the states). 
 227. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3093–95 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); Williams, In the 
Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 4, at 395 & n.212 (citing opinions of Justices Burger, Powell, and 
Rehnquist). 
 228. Compare Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563–66 (1990) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to federal affirmative action measures, but strict scrutiny to state measures), with Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227–31 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 
and applying strict scrutiny to all race-based affirmative action). 
 229. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972). 
 230. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (noting that federal courts “operate[] 
under the unanimity rule”). McDonald casts doubt on Apodaca’s continuing vitality, but did not 
specifically overrule it. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14 (plurality opinion). 
 231. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117 app. at 138–43 (1970).  
 232. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 905, 950–52 (1994). 
 233. ROSCOE POUND FOUND., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 62 (Barbara Wolfson ed., 1993) (referring to state judges’ “vigorous[] reject[ion]” 
of the “call to turn away from unique state sources”). 
 234. Kahn, supra note 75, at 1160. 
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Thus, any efforts to craft state constitutional law based on state identities is 
doomed to fail. In other words, the constitutional values that matter—in 
both state and federal cases—are national ones.235 
But in the course of describing that objection, the strength of the thesis 
begins to emerge more clearly. For even if states’ primacy as sources of 
political power and identity has faded over time, it does not necessarily 
follow that state courts are inadequate when it comes to articulating 
constitutional rights.236 State courts, after all, remain charged with the 
elaboration and enforcement of federal constitutional law,237 and, as noted 
above, they generally have followed federal doctrine even when 
supposedly applying state constitutional law.238 In any event, federal 
constitutional law already is shaped by the states, since it “often 
incorporates state law by reference, taking on local hues and molding its 
shape to fit different and changing state law rules.”239 Thus, for example, 
“legitimate expectations of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment are in 
some sense dependent on background state law regarding property and 
privacy.240 Takings doctrine, too, is a federal rule, but it depends on state 
law to define what counts as property. When applying these doctrines, 
federal courts have no choice but to consider state law, constitutional or 
otherwise. 
The more one moves away from the notion of states as separate from 
the nation, the more useful state courts become as expositors of federal 
constitutional values. If the lines between state and federal power and law 
 
 235. See Gardner, supra note 33, at 828 (“The tension between state and national 
constitutionalism has been largely resolved in the modern day United States by the collapse of 
meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social consensus that fundamental values in this 
country will be debated and resolved on a national level.”); Kahn, supra note 75, at 1166 (“Whatever 
the differences in historical origins [of the states], those differences are less and less relevant to today’s 
communities.”). 
 236. Force, supra note 42, at 127 (“Whatever future the states have as viable governmental 
entities, state and/or local responsibility for protecting individual rights need not be substantially 
undermined by the two factors cited most for the decline of the states: limited finances and obsolete 
government structures.”). 
 237. Bator, supra note 209, at 605 (considering “the role of the state courts in the elaboration of 
federal constitutional law and the enforcement of federal constitutional principles”).  
 238. See Johansen, supra note 62, at 317 (“[M]ost state courts have very little to guide their 
interpretation of the state constitution other than a body of state case law dependent primarily on the 
United States Constitution.”). 
 239. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Lord Camden Meets Federalism—Using State Constitutions to 
Counter Federal Abuses, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 845, 854 (1996). 
 240. Id. at 860. See also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1985) (noting that “[i]n 
evaluating the reasonableness of police procedures” the Court has “looked to prevailing rules in 
individual [state] jurisdictions”). 
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have blurred,241 the proper response is not to ignore state constitutionalism, 
but to recognize that it is part and parcel of the federal constitutional 
system. State constitutions themselves “flourish in light of, and not despite, 
the American constitutional system.”242 As James A. Gardner puts it, “a 
state constitution belongs jointly to the polities of both the state and the 
nation.”243 After all, the “American federal system . . . [is] a single 
mechanism,” of which the states are a part.244 
State and federal courts are therefore engaged in an interlocking 
system of interpretation, just as their respective constitutions are parts of an 
interdependent constitutional structure. The structure of American 
federalism, in other words, need not be one that simply divides and 
separates judicial power. It can instead be one in which various interpretive 
bodies, both state and federal, are engaged in a shared enterprise of 
articulating constitutional values.245 To a certain extent, jurisdictional rules 
can encourage this kind of dialogue.246 But as an interpretive matter, the 
conversation between courts must also include something a bit more 
subtle—not just respecting each other’s space, but learning from each 
other’s experience. 
B.  PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
Having described the arguments for and against the use of state 
constitutional law in federal cases, and sketched a possible taxonomy for 
areas in which it may be appropriate, the thesis can be tested against actual 
constitutional practice. 
As noted above, federal courts have never used—and still do not 
 
 241. Gardner, supra note 153, at 1256–59. See also Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory 
of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2141 (2006) (describing a theory of “interactive 
federalism” that “rejects the three key elements of dualism,” because it “does not seek to draw 
boundaries between state and federal power[,] . . . does not prohibit the national government from 
coordinating state and federal claims,” and “does not conceive of states as distinctive communities of 
value”).  
 242. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 289.  
 243. Gardner, supra note 153, at 1254. 
 244. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 14 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966). See also Elazar, supra note 204, at 976 (arguing that 
federalism does not presuppose a hierarchy in which states are inferior). 
 245. Kahn, supra note 75, at 1148 (“The diversity of state courts is best understood as a diversity 
of interpretive bodies, not as a multiplicity of representatives of distinct sovereigns.”). 
 246. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and 
the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (describing the Warren Court’s habeas jurisprudence as 
“structur[ing] a dialogue on the future of constitutional requirements in criminal law in which state and 
federal courts were required both to speak and listen as equals”). 
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use—state constitutional doctrine to nearly the same degree as state courts 
have used federal doctrine. There are, however, some notable exceptions to 
the general history of neglect.247 In New York Times v. Sullivan,248 for 
example, the Court specifically modeled the actual malice test on “a like 
rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts.”249 And although 
headcounting is difficult, it seems that around the turn of the century, when 
state courts were populated by giants like Benjamin Cardozo and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the Court was more likely to take guidance from them. In 
Davis v. Massachusetts,250 for example, the Justices not only deferred to 
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that was being 
appealed251—an opinion authored by Holmes—but also relied on other 
decisions of that court penned by their future colleague.252 Notably, the 
current Court is the first in history with no Justices who have ever served 
on a state court. 
The following subsections consider three areas in which state 
constitutional law has had the most influence on modern federal doctrine: 
criminal procedure, due process, and the Eighth Amendment. Together, 
these examples both illustrate the arguments discussed in Part III and 
confirm the taxonomy suggested in Part IV.A. Broadly, the Court’s reliance 
on state constitutional law in the criminal procedure context reflects a 
pragmatic form of learning from the states’ experience and growing 
unanimity about such practical matters as whether the exclusionary rule 
deters unconstitutional searches. This is essentially persuasive authority. In 
the due process and Eighth Amendment contexts, by contrast, the Court has 
looked to widely shared state practice as “objective” evidence of whether a 
particular right is fundamental or a particular punishment is cruel or 
unusual. These are more akin to a strict version of reverse incorporation—
using state constitutional law to define federal standard doctrine. 
 
 247. Holland, supra note 23, at 998 (“State court decisions shaped federal law in the areas of 
judicial review, substantive due process, freedom of speech, religion, eminent domain, the right to bear 
arms, and the rights of the accused.”). See also Friesen, supra note 81, at 28 & n.12 (discussing 
examples of state constitutional law influence on Supreme Court decisions). 
 248. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 249. Id. at 280 (citing, inter alia, Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)). See also THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 43 (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982) (“[S]tate 
courts played an important role in laying the foundations for a modern-day understanding of freedom of 
speech and of the press.”); Deckle McLean, Origins of the Actual Malice Test, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 750, 
751–52 (1985) (tracing the test from Sullivan back to Kansas Supreme Court decisions). 
 250. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46–47 (1897). 
 251. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895). 
 252. Davis, 167 U.S. at 47 (citing Lincoln v. City of Bos., 20 N.E. 329, 330 (Mass. 1889) 
(Holmes, J.)). 
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1.  Criminal Procedure 
State constitutional law has had a direct influence on the Court’s 
criminal procedure jurisprudence. Two examples in particular stand out: 
the exclusionary rule and the right to counsel. Both demonstrate a 
cooperative constitutional dialogue between the state and federal courts. 253 
The exclusionary rule itself is generally thought to be a federal 
invention. When the Supreme Court first employed it in 1914’s Weeks v. 
United States,254 few state courts had yet done so under their own 
constitutions or constitutional law.255 And Weeks, which predated the 
Court’s modern incorporation doctrine, applied the rule only against federal 
officials. Initially, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court decided not to incorporate 
the rule against the states.256 But by that time, at least sixteen state courts 
had followed the reasoning of Weeks and interpreted their state 
constitutions to require the exclusionary rule.257 And just twelve years after 
Wolf, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court reversed course and decided to 
incorporate the rule after all.258 In doing so, it explicitly relied on the states’ 
independent embrace of the exclusionary rule.259 It noted that when Wolf 
 
 253. Other examples exist. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Today, 
every State incorporates some form of the prohibition [on double jeopardy] in its constitution or 
common law.”). 
 254. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 255. See Force, supra note 42, at 148 (“Weeks was a precedent shattering case; neither federal nor 
state courts which had followed the common law approach until then had anything else to rely on.”). 
Robert Force slightly misses the mark with regard to state law, however. It seems that at least a handful 
of states excluded unconstitutionally obtained evidence even before Weeks. See, e.g., State v. Sheridan, 
96 N.W. 730, 730–31 (Iowa 1903) (finding evidence obtained with an improper warrant inadmissible); 
State v. Height, 91 N.W. 935, 938–40 (Iowa 1902) (finding evidence obtained during a compelled 
physical examination inadmissible); State v. Newcomb, 119 S.W. 405, 409 (Mo. 1909) (finding 
compelled examination evidence inadmissible); People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 216, 217–18 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1873) (same).  
 256. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 257. Id. app. at 33–38 (listing sixteen states as following the Weeks rule and thirty-one as having 
rejected it). See also Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the State Constitution Something 
Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1448 n.54 (2005) (“[T]he 
heretical influence of [Weeks] spread, and evoked a contagion of sentimentality in some of the State 
Courts, inducing them to break loose from long-settled fundamentals.” (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2184, at 633 (2d ed. 1923))). 
 258. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 259. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1039 (“[T]he Court was deeply influenced by an emerging 
consensus among state courts, which it carefully and extensively documented, that suppression of 
illegally seized evidence was the most effective way to deter constitutionally unreasonable searches.”). 
Whether the states’ embrace of the exclusionary rule was truly “independent” is harder to say. It is 
entirely possible that by announcing the rule in Weeks, the Court influenced the states and thereby 
helped manufacture the majority it later found relevant. 
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was decided in 1949, “almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the 
use of the exclusionary rule,”260 but that by the time of Mapp in 1961, 
“more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or 
judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered” to it.261 The 
Court especially emphasized the ruling of the California Supreme Court in 
People v. Cahan,262 which concluded that the exclusionary rule was the 
only remedy that could ensure compliance with constitutional 
guarantees.263 The Court therefore relied on the states not just as 
independent expositors of constitutional values, but as laboratories whose 
practical experience with constitutional rules was enlightening. Notably, 
Justice Clark’s opinion for the Court in Mapp also specifically addressed 
then-Judge Cardozo’s rejection of the exclusionary rule in New York,264 
saying that “the force of [Cardozo’s] reasoning has been largely vitiated by 
later decisions of this Court.”265 That the Mapp majority felt it appropriate 
to respond to the contrary reasoning of a state court is notable, if only to 
demonstrate how a state judge with Cardozo’s standing and influence can 
command respect.  
The state-federal constitutional dialogue about the exclusionary rule 
has continued, though increasingly it seems that only state courts are 
listening. The Court has progressively limited the reach of the exclusionary 
rule since incorporating it against the states in Mapp. In United States v. 
Leon,266 for example, the Court held that the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule was to deter future police misconduct,267 and that it therefore should 
not apply in cases in which police officers rely on a warrant they believe in 
good faith to be valid.268 At least twenty state courts, however, have 
rejected both the deterrence rationale and the good faith exception.269 
Perhaps the Court will revisit Leon’s reasoning and rule if that number 
reaches the fifty percent figure that seemed so significant in Mapp. 
State constitutional law has also been influential in the Court’s right to 
 
 260. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. 
 261. Id. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 app. at 224–25 (1960) (noting that twenty-
six states had voluntarily adopted the exclusionary rule by 1960). 
 262. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. 
 263. See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911–12 (Cal. 1955). 
 264. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653. 
 265. Id. (referring to Cardozo’s opinion in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926)). 
 266. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 267. Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 268. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)). 
 269. Friesen, supra note 222, at 1080. See generally Leigh A. Morrissey, Note, State Courts 
Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND. L. REV. 917 
(1994) (examining state courts’ rejection of the good faith exception). 
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counsel jurisprudence. In Johnson v. Zerbst,270 the Court held that indigent 
defendants had a right to appointed counsel in federal prosecutions. Zerbst, 
in turn, quoted and relied on the Court’s earlier decision in Patton v. United 
States271:  
Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other 
parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to “. . . the 
humane policy of the modern criminal law . . .” which now provides that 
a defendant “. . . if he be poor, . . . may have counsel furnished him by 
the state . . . not infrequently . . . more able than the attorney for the 
state.”272 
But Patton, in turn, was quoting from the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
decision in Hack v. State.273 The state court’s reasoning had thereby 
become part of the federal rule. And it was not simply the state court’s 
language that influenced the Supreme Court. Thirty years after Zerbst, Yale 
Kamisar noted that when in 1938 the Court held that the right of the 
accused “to have the assistance of counsel for his defense” provided by the 
Sixth Amendment included the right of indigents to be furnished counsel, 
thirty states already afforded counsel as of right to all indigent felony 
defendants.274 Robert Force concludes, “It was the states’ approach to the 
accuseds’ rights which supplied the strongest support for the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Patton v. United States, which in turn, provided the 
major authority for the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst.”275 
There have been other occasions on which federal constitutional rules 
followed state constitutional rules, albeit not always explicitly. The 
principle of Batson v. Kentucky,276 for example, had already been endorsed 
by some state courts before the Supreme Court embraced it.277 And long 
before the Court extended Batson’s rule to cover preemptory challenges 
based on gender,278 many state courts did as much under their own 
constitutions.279 Similarly, when the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
 
 270. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
 271. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 
 272. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (quoting Patton, 281 U.S. at 308). 
 273. Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (Wis. 1910). 
 274. Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on “The 
Most Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1962) (footnote omitted). 
 275. Force, supra note 42, at 145. 
 276. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (prohibiting preemptory challenges in jury 
selection based on race). 
 277. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761–62 (Cal. 1978). 
 278. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1994).  
 279. See, e.g., State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849–50 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 
568 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (Mass. 1991); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 49–50 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). 
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prohibits the exclusion of women from juries, it noted that this conclusion 
was “consistent with the current judgment of the country, now evidenced 
by legislative or constitutional provisions in every State and at the federal 
level qualifying women for jury service.”280 
Criminal procedure remains a comparatively rich area of dialogue 
between state and federal courts. Indeed, in many ways it was the Burger 
Court’s perceived restriction of constitutional criminal procedure rights that 
first inspired the “New Judicial Federalism.”281 And there may be a special 
reason for this, which is that federalism concerns—and concomitant respect 
for the states’ governmental interests—are especially strong in the context 
of criminal prosecutions.282 Perhaps, then, criminal procedure is one of 
those areas in which the underlying values of reverse incorporation—
respect for federalism and state expertise, for example—are particularly 
salient. 
2.  Substantive Due Process and Incorporation 
State constitutional doctrine has played a notable, albeit less direct, 
role in the Court’s substantive due process and incorporation cases. This 
may not be entirely surprising, since the inquiries in both sets of cases 
focus on what rights are “fundamental.” State constitutional law can serve 
as uniquely good evidence of what rights meet that standard. 283  
The Supreme Court considered the Due Process Clause only twice 
between 1789 and 1868.284 State courts therefore had an opportunity to 
define many of the relevant terms—“deprive,” “liberty,” and “property”—
before federal courts did.285 When the Court eventually embraced the 
concept of substantive due process and a corresponding protection of 
 
 280. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975). 
 281. George R. Moore, Note, Expanding Criminal Procedural Rights Under State Constitutions, 
33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 909, 915 (1976) (“[A] rapidly increasing number of state courts have declined 
to follow Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law area, and have established higher standards 
within their respective states based upon the authority of state constitutions.”). See also supra note 77. 
 282. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (“The deference we owe to the 
decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system . . . is enhanced where the specification of 
punishments is concerned, for ‘these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’” (quoting Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958))). 
 283. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (“A rule adopted with such unanimous 
accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like 
the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental 
nature of that right.”). 
 284. Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 
431, 441 (1926). 
 285. Id. 
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unenumerated rights, its definition of those rights depended on whether the 
right was a “fundamental principle[] of liberty and justice”286 or “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”287 The question essentially boiled down 
to whether there was a tradition protecting the right,288 an inquiry for which 
state constitutional law—and the states’ longer tradition of due process 
jurisprudence—has proven particularly useful.  
The Supreme Court’s sexual privacy decisions are illuminating 
examples. In Bowers v. Hardwick,289 the Court upheld a Georgia statute 
criminalizing sodomy. In doing so, the Court relied heavily on a history of 
state regulation (implicit evidence that the states did not recognize a 
constitutional right to sodomy), noting that before 1961 “all 50 States 
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia 
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and 
between consenting adults.”290 After Bowers, however, state courts, relying 
on their own state constitutions, began “to extend the protection the 
Supreme Court withheld.”291 In 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court itself 
specifically rejected the Bowers rule, holding the very same sodomy statute 
unconstitutional under the state’s Due Process Clause.292 The Georgia court 
noted that it was not bound to interpret that clause in parallel with the 
Supreme Court’s (concededly final) interpretation of the federal Due 
Process Clause, despite the fact that the two clauses were nearly identically 
worded.293 The Georgia Supreme Court was not the only state court to 
reject the Bowers reasoning.294 Interestingly, the Texas Court of Appeals 
was among this group, striking down Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy.295 
 
 286. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 
316 (1926)). 
 287. Id. at 325. 
 288. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19, 723 (1997) (reviewing state law and 
concluding “we are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the 
asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today”). 
 289. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
 290. Id. at 193–94. 
 291. Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1219 (1994). 
 292. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24–26 (Ga. 1998). 
 293. Id. at 22 (“[T]he ‘right to be let alone’ guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is far more 
extensive than the right of privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution . . . .”). Compare GA. CONST. art. 
I, § 1, ¶ I (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”), with 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 294. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940–41 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 
A.2d 47, 49–50 (Pa. 1980); supra note 124.  
 295. State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. App. 1992), rev’d, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994) 
(striking down Texas Penal Code section 21.06). The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
Morales on the grounds that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the statute. 
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers.296 It 
noted that many state courts, construing “provisions in their own state 
constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,”297 had rejected the Bowers rule. These state court decisions 
made up a part of the criticism of Bowers that, as the Lawrence Court 
recognized, had been “substantial and continuing, disapproving of its 
reasoning in all respects.”298 Thus, as commentators have noted, “It is clear 
that judicial federalism influenced the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Lawrence, as the Court found the trend in the states towards 
decriminalization, a trend largely driven by judicial federalism, worthy of 
consideration in its federal due process analysis.”299 Reviewing cases like 
Lawrence, Gardner concludes that “particularly in the last fifteen years or 
so, . . . . the Court has increasingly used the content of state law to provide 
a baseline against which to measure whether any particular individual right 
can be considered part of the fundamental liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”300 
That question—whether something is a “fundamental liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment”—is essentially the same inquiry the Court 
pursues when deciding whether to incorporate a particular provision of the 
federal Bill of Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Under the Court’s selective incorporation jurisprudence, the test is 
“whether a right is among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’”301 
And even before there was an incorporation doctrine, the Court looked to 
state constitutional law when determining whether to apply federal rules 
against the states. In 1833’s Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, for example, 
the Court concluded that the federal Bill of Rights did not bind the states.302 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court was deeply grounded in state 
 
See State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947–48 (Tex. 1994). This set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas,  
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), which would invalidate the statute yet again.  
 296. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
 297. Id. at 576. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Fitzpatrick, supra note 34, at 1855.  
 300. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1040; id. at 1042 (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s approach in due 
process cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment suggests strongly that state courts have the 
ability to influence indirectly the content of nationally guaranteed liberties through their rulings under 
cognate provisions of state constitutions. More to the point, it seems possible for state courts to use this 
process to work actively, if slowly, to undermine Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution 
with which they disagree.”). 
 301. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 
(1932)). 
 302. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833). 
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constitutionalism: 
Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, 
provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular 
government as its judgment dictated. . . . In their several constitutions 
[the states] have imposed such restrictions on their respective 
governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most 
proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge 
exclusively . . . .303 
Thus, state constitutional guarantees were originally seen as a reason 
not to hold states to the terms of the federal document. And even when the 
Court did eventually incorporate the federal Bill of Rights against the 
states, it occasionally did so with an eye toward state constitutional law. 
Wolf and Mapp, described above,304 are perfect examples—the latter based 
the decision to incorporate the exclusionary rule against the states on the 
fact that the states had already embraced it. Interestingly, the plurality 
opinion in McDonald—the Court’s most recent and perhaps highest-profile 
incorporation case—did not make use of a near-unanimous state 
constitutional practice protecting the right at issue. Part IV.C discusses 
McDonald’s approach in more detail. 
3.  The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” 
punishment has inspired a somewhat distinct constitutional jurisprudence, 
one which is heavily comparativist and draws on both foreign and state law 
sources. 
International sources have long played a prominent and controversial 
role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases. In Trop v. Dulles305—perhaps 
the foundation of the Court’s modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—
the Court established an inquiry that looks to whether a particular 
punishment violates “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”306 That inquiry, the Court has long 
recognized, can be advanced by looking to sources from other sovereigns, 
including foreign and international sources. The Trop Court, for example, 
concluded that denationalization was cruel and unusual, based in part on 
the fact that “only two countries [out of eighty-four surveyed] . . . impose 
 
 303. Id. at 247–48. 
 304. See supra notes 259–67 and accompanying text. 
 305. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).  
 306. Id. at 101. 
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denationalization as a penalty for desertion.”307 In Atkins v. Virginia,308 the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of the 
mentally retarded, noting that “within the world community, the imposition 
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved.”309 And three years later, in Roper v. 
Simmons,310 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment also prohibited the 
execution of juvenile offenders, again citing foreign law.311 
Other examples of citation to foreign sources are not hard to find in 
Eighth Amendment cases.312 For good or ill, the practice demonstrates the 
Court’s willingness to construct federal constitutional law based in part on 
the experiences of other sovereigns. But even more important in the search 
for “objective indicia” is domestic consensus—that is, the practices of the 
states. Interestingly, the Court has generally looked to state legislatures, not 
state constitutions, as the most appropriate evidence of moral consensus.313 
For example, the Court has stated that the “clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 
country’s legislatures.”314 If state legislative enactments are useful 
indicators of current social values, then it seems that state constitutions 
 
 307. Id. at 103 (citation omitted). 
 308. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 309. Id. at 316 n.21 (citation omitted). 
 310. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 311. Id. at 575–78; id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he existence of an international 
consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American 
consensus.”). See Comment, The Debate over Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
103, 103 n.9 (2005) (citing divergent scholarly opinions on the appropriateness and significance of the 
Court’s use of foreign law for constitutional analysis in Roper); Ernest A. Young, Comment, Foreign 
Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 153–56 (2005) (arguing that decisions like 
Roper use foreign law only superficially, as “nose-counting” to increase the denominator and make 
divergent U.S. law look like “an outlier,” but without learning anything persuasive). 
 312. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 604–05 (“This inquiry [into international and foreign law] 
reflects the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its 
meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized society.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830 (1988) (noting that the decision was “consistent with the views that have been expressed 
by . . . other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the 
Western European community”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (“It is thus not 
irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death 
penalty for rape where death did not ensue.”). 
 313. Hills, supra note 8, at 17 (describing reliance on state law). 
 314. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“The 
beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the 
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 
(2002) (referring to “the country’s legislatures” as the best source of such consensus); Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“First among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude 
toward a given sanction are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.” (quoting McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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should be as well, especially given the political responsiveness of state 
constitutions.  
C.  THE SPECIAL EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Perhaps the most important contemporary issue for “reverse 
incorporation” is the use of state constitutional law in interpreting the 
newly incorporated Second Amendment. In many ways, the Second 
Amendment presents the perfect test of the thesis: nearly all state 
constitutions recognize the “individual” right to keep and bear arms; state 
constitutional law is well established and remarkably uniform in finding 
that right to be subject to “reasonable” regulation; federal doctrine is almost 
nonexistent; and (even holding aside the Amendment’s arguably 
federalism-focused language) gun regulation seems to be an area in which 
respect for the states’ police power and practical experience is particularly 
important. And yet the plurality opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago 
seemed somewhat ambivalent toward contemporary state constitutional 
law. 
For nearly two hundred years, it was widely understood and frequently 
held that the Second Amendment is essentially a federalism-based 
provision intended to protect state militia from disarmament by the federal 
government.315 In District of Columbia v. Heller,316 however, the Supreme 
Court held that the Amendment actually protects an “individual” right—
that is, one not necessarily related to militia service—thus inaugurating a 
new era of Second Amendment jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court did 
not entirely reject the federalism-based reading of the Amendment,317 and 
it did make explicit use of state constitutional law.318 But Heller left open 
at least two major questions: whether the “individual” right to keep and 
bear arms should be incorporated against the states, and what standard of 
review should be used to evaluate restrictions on that right.319  
 
 315. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 316. Id. at 595 (majority opinion). 
 317. See, e.g., id. at 599 (recognizing that “self-defense had little to do with the right’s 
codification” and “the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by 
taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a 
written Constitution”). The majority thus apparently endorsed, to some degree, the view taken in United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), that the Amendment was adopted “[w]ith obvious purpose to 
assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces” and “must be 
interpreted and applied with that end in view.” Id. at 178. 
 318. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584–85, 590 n.13, 591, 600–04, 612–14, 629. 
 319. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (concluding that 
the Supreme Court “consciously left the appropriate level of scrutiny for another day”). 
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The former question was directly presented and affirmatively 
answered in McDonald; the latter was indirectly presented and not 
answered. State constitutional practice would seem to be relevant to both 
questions, and indeed state law played an interesting role in the various 
opinions issued by the Justices. The plurality paid little attention to 
contemporary state constitutional practice, despite the strong support it 
would have offered for the decision to incorporate. Instead, Justice Alito’s 
opinion took something of an originalist approach, citing only those state 
constitutions in existence at the Founding320 or when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified.321 These were presented as evidence that the 
individual right to keep and bear arms is fundamental. Similarly, Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion cited state constitutional provisions and 
decisions from the 1800s for the proposition that the right to keep and bear 
arms is a privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.322  
The dissenting opinions took a different lesson from state 
constitutional law. Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he vast majority of States 
already recognize a right to keep and bear arms in their own 
constitutions,”323 but concluded that the answer to the incorporation 
question “cannot be found in a granular inspection of state constitutions or 
congressional debates.”324 On the question of incorporation, Justice Stevens 
pointed to the states’ history of “extremely intensive, carefully considered 
regulation” of gun rights, which, he found, “tend[ed] to suggest that” the 
right was not “of fundamental character.”325 Justice Breyer also argued 
against incorporation, but—as he had in Heller—focused on the still-open 
standard of review question. And as to that question, he (and the three 
Justices who joined him) endorsed the approach described in this Article, 
suggesting that “the Court could lessen the difficulty of the mission it has 
created for itself by adopting a jurisprudential approach similar to the many 
state courts that administer a state constitutional right to bear arms.”326 He 
 
 320. McDonald v. City of Chicago., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010) (plurality opinion) (referring to 
“the four States that had adopted Second Amendment analogues before ratification, [and] nine more 
States [that] adopted state constitutional provisions protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms 
between 1789 and 1820”). 
 321. Id. at 3042 (“The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by state constitutions 
at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”). 
 322. Id. at 3079–88 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 323. Id. at 3095 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 324. Id. at 3098. 
 325. Id. at 3113 n.43. 
 326. Id. at 3127 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id. at 3130 (noting that “many States have 
constitutional provisions protecting gun possession” but that “those provisions typically do no more 
than guarantee that a gun regulation will be a reasonable police power regulation”); id. at 3134 (“I think 
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noted, ruefully, that the Court had declined to do so in Heller and then 
again in McDonald. 
Had the Justices given more weight to contemporary state 
constitutional law, they might have found something of a middle ground: 
incorporation of the right, as favored by the plurality and Justice Thomas, 
but subject to reasonable regulation, as favored by the dissenting Justices 
(and not ruled out by the other five). Such an approach would have been in 
keeping both with the Court’s prior practice and with the thesis of this 
Article. As noted above, the Court has often looked to state constitutional 
practice to determine whether a particular right is “fundamental” and 
therefore subject to incorporation. In the context of the Second 
Amendment, this approach counsels in favor of incorporation, because all 
but a handful of states have constitutional guarantees protecting the right to 
keep and bear arms, and many of them explicitly protect the “individual” 
right recognized by the Court in Heller.327 As if to drive the point home, 
thirty-eight states signed an amicus brief in McDonald arguing that the 
Second Amendment should be incorporated.328 The brief was no doubt 
inspired more by politics than by fear of self-imposed gun regulation—
after all, a state’s elected officials do not need the Supreme Court to stop 
them from passing gun regulations—but at the very least it suggests that 
the states themselves favor the constitutional protection of an “individual” 
right to keep and bear arms.329 Indeed, since nearly all states already 
protect such a right, the incorporation of the Second Amendment would not 
necessarily have much of an impact on them. 
 
that it is essential to consider the recent history of the right to bear arms for private self-defense when 
considering whether the right is ‘fundamental.’ To that end, many States now provide state 
constitutional protection for an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 327. See Volokh, supra note 21, at 192 (concluding that forty-four states protect an “individual” 
right, though Virginia and Kansas are equivocal on the matter); Winkler, supra note 22, at 686, 711 
(concluding that forty-two states protect an individual right to bear arms).  
 328. See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McDonald, 
130 S.Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378909. Thirty-one states made the same argument in Heller, 
even though incorporation was not an issue in that case. See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23 n.6, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-
290), 2008 WL 405558 (arguing for incorporation of the right). Wisconsin, a late joiner, added an 
amicus brief for the respondent arguing in favor of the individual right interpretation, but noting its 
preference that the Second Amendment not be incorporated against the states. See Brief of the State of 
Wis. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4–5, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 
543032. 
 329. There is some historical precedent for states requesting that federal constitutional rules be 
applied to them. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), twenty-two states asked the Court to 
overrule Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and require the states to provide counsel in state 
prosecutions as well. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. Three states urged that Betts be left intact. Id. at 345. 
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But that raises the second issue left unanswered in Heller: What 
standard of review should be employed to evaluate Second Amendment 
claims? If the standard were to be set “higher” than that employed by the 
states, it would displace their constitutional law just as surely as the Warren 
Court did with regard to so many other individual rights. But if instead the 
Court were to look to the states for persuasive authority, it would find that, 
as with the incorporation question, state constitutional law is remarkably 
uniform and clear330: every state court to have reached the question has 
concluded that its state analogue of the Second Amendment permits 
“reasonable” regulation of firearms.331 In other words, along with their long 
history of recognizing a right to keep and bear arms, states have a 
“tradition” of limiting that right.332 The “fundamental” right that is 
protected, therefore, is a reasonable right to keep and bear arms.333 
Nearly every factor discussed above counsels in favor of federal 
adoption of the states’ constitutional rule.334 The states’ constitutional 
provisions are similar in content and spirit to the “individual” right-based 
Second Amendment, which, even after Heller, seems to have something to 
do with federalism. States have far more experience than the federal 
government when it comes to charting the lines between gun rights and 
safety regulation,335 and the “reasonableness” standard they have 
unanimously endorsed both reflects their collective wisdom on the subject 
and permits individual states to tailor gun regulations to their own 
circumstances. Indeed, the thirty-one state brief maintained that “[s]tate and 
local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue 
under the Second Amendment.”336 The states concluded that “[d]enying 
local governments the power to nullify the Amendment will not increase 
federal power, mandate any state action pursuant to federal directives, or 
preclude reasonable state and local regulation of firearms.”337 The plurality 
went so far as to quote that passage of the states’ brief, claiming that the 
 
 330. See supra Part IV.A. 
 331. Winkler, supra note 22, at 686–87 & n.12. Winkler has the unusual distinction of being cited 
by name during a Supreme Court oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, McDonald, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 710088. 
 332. Brief of Thirty-Four Prof’l Historians & Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 2, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59025. 
 333. See Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597, 
598 (2006). 
 334. See supra note 317. 
 335. See Winkler, supra note 22, at 715–26. 
 336. Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23, McDonald, 
130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378909 (emphasis added). 
 337. Id. at 23–24 (emphasis added). 
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incorporated Amendment “limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability 
to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.”338 
But despite quoting the states’ use of the word “reasonable,” the plurality 
did not embrace it as a standard, instead reiterating the same categorical 
carve outs established in Heller.339 
Because the McDonald court declined to establish a standard of 
review for Second Amendment claims, it is not too late for the Supreme 
Court—and other federal courts now faced with the daunting task of 
evaluating Second Amendment claims with little guidance from the 
Court—to effectuate respect for state constitutional practice by adopting 
something like a reasonableness standard. Indeed, the questions and their 
relationship to state law are deeply intertwined. On the one hand, the states’ 
recognition of a right to keep and bear arms is among the strongest 
evidence for the argument that the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history” and thus subject to incorporation. On the other hand, one must take 
note of what right the states have recognized: a right that can be reasonably 
regulated. 
D.  OTHER APPLICATIONS 
The “individual” right to keep and bear arms presents an unusual and 
perhaps uniquely useful test case for the thesis of this Article, given the 
similarities between the state and federal rights, the remarkable unanimity 
of state law, and the near absence of relevant federal doctrine. 
It may very well be that no other constitutional issue presents quite the 
same clear-cut opportunity. But given the extensive borrowing that takes 
place among state courts, and the textual similarities between their 
constitutions and the federal document, it also seems likely that there are 
other constitutional questions on which a large majority of state courts have 
reached similar or identical conclusions. Perhaps most intriguing is the 
potential influence of those widely recognized state constitutional rights 
that lack explicit federal analogues. These rights may seem like unlikely 
candidates for “reverse incorporation,” given their dissimilarity from 
federal guarantees. And yet the federal Due Process Clause could 
accommodate these rights just as it does others that are not enumerated in 
the federal document. After all, the Court has incorporated nontextual 
federal protections against the states, including the “beyond a reasonable 
 
 338. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046. 
 339. Id. at 3047. 
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doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions.340 If incorporation can account 
for these nontextual rights, reverse incorporation should likewise be able to 
account for rights that are guaranteed at the state level, albeit in provisions 
that have no direct federal analogues. 
Most notable in this regard may be the right to education, which is 
specifically recognized by forty-nine state constitutions—a convincing 
majority, if ever there was one—and has often been invoked and enforced 
by state courts. Of course, the federal Constitution has no such textual 
guarantee, and the Supreme Court has found that it is not an unenumerated 
“fundamental” right.341 But broadly recognized and accepted state 
constitutional law suggests that the Court should reconsider. At the very 
least, if the Court were to confront the question today it would be difficult 
to hold that a right which is specifically enumerated in forty-nine state 
constitutions is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”342 
as evidenced by “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”343 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is something unusual about the degree to which federal courts, 
despite looking to international and scholarly sources for help in 
constructing constitutional doctrine, have ignored state courts’ 
interpretation of provisions that are deeply intertwined—textually, 
historically, and legally—with those of the federal charter. Given that state 
courts are the judicial branch of a coequal sovereign in our federalist 
system—a system to which the Supreme Court pays frequent homage—it is 
surprising that they have not been able to catch the Justices’ eyes more 
often. By describing the arguments for and against reliance on state 
constitutional law in federal constitutional cases, this Article has attempted 
at the very least to provide a possible and partial explanation for the 
Justices’ negligence. 
But there is also a slight normative claim here, which is that state 
constitutional law should receive more attention from the federal courts 
than it currently does. This is a slight claim for two reasons. First, since 
federal courts have heretofore tended to ignore state courts’ construction of 
their own constitutions, it would not take much to amount to “more” 
 
 340. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 341. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1973). 
 342. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
 343. Id.  
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attention. Second, it is a slight claim because there are many areas of 
constitutional law in which the costs of looking to state constitutional law 
will outweigh the benefits, either because state law is not well developed, 
not uniform, or is so different that comparison is impossible. 
Whatever these areas of law may be, the right to keep and bear arms is 
not one of them. And so the Article concludes with a sharper critical claim: 
the Court’s failure in McDonald to take into account the states’ unanimous, 
long-held, and well-established constitutional conclusion that the right to 
keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation was a serious 
shortcoming. Fortunately, since McDonald declined to set any standard at 
all, the problem can be corrected by future courts or by the Justices 
themselves, so long as they are willing to look to state constitutional law, 
which shaped the federal Constitution at the Founding and could continue 
to do so today. 
